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Power systems are experiencing drastic changes with the introduction of renewable 
and customer-owned resources. These changes introduce new challenges in the protection, 
control, and operation of power systems. They are concurrent with utilities’ efforts to boost 
system reliability. Such efforts are undermined by the vulnerability of protection system to 
hidden failures. Accordingly, it is necessary to develop new methods that can cope with 
new characteristics and avoid relay misoperations because of hidden failures.  
In response to these challenges, relay manufacturers and researchers have proposed 
several protection schemes. Many of these schemes, especially those concerned with 
hidden failure detection, employ adaptive protection schemes to increase the security of 
protection systems. Adaptive protection schemes have several disadvantages. First, they 
do not address the issue of instrumentation channel (i.e., CT and PT) failures. Moreover, 
they are complex schemes because the algorithms depend on predefined contingencies. 
Hence, they require intensive studies to identify the behavior of each relay under various 
fault conditions and contingencies. Finally, adaptive schemes cannot cope with the 
revolutionary changes in power systems such as the introduction of renewable resources 
and power electronic devices. These disadvantages mandate a new philosophy which is 
capitalizing on technology advancement that paves the way for a paradigm shift in 
protection systems.  
This dissertation introduces a new dynamic state estimation-based centralized 
protection scheme (DSEBCPS) at the substation level. This system supplements dynamic 
state estimation-based protection for individual zones known as “settingless relays” to 
 xix
secure their operation against hidden failures. The DSEBCPS communicates with the 
settingless relays via the station bus and obtains essential information from each protection 
zone, such as phasor quantities, breakers, and disconnect status. This information is 
processed by the DSEBCPS to extract the substation topology and states. Specifically, the 
DSEBCPS performs dynamic state estimations in the quasi-dynamic domain once per cycle 
to detect any sort of abnormality within the substation. Upon detecting abnormalities, the 
DSEBCPS performs hypothesis testing to distinguish between faults and hidden failures. 
The DSEBCPS detects and locates hidden failures within the substation through hypothesis 
testing. Then, the DSEBCPS streams the estimated measurements that correspond to the 
detected bad measurements to the settingless relay to replace the compromised 
measurements. It’s capability to detect hidden failures and replace the compromised 
measurements in real time secure settingless relays from misoperation and ensure high 
dependability even with the presence of hidden failures. Such capability bridges a critical 
gap in protection systems. The integration of the proposed scheme and the individual zone 
protection form a resilient protection system that is self-immunized against hidden failures. 
The DSEBCPS concept has been tested with numerous numerical experiments. More 
specifically, five cases of hidden failures were simulated: (1) PT blown fuse, (2) CT 
saturation, (3) CT short circuit, (4) CT reverse polarity, and (5) wrong CT ratio setting. 
Critical to this work is the ability to manage data and communications between the 
various devices (i.e., MUs, settingless relays, and DSEBCPS) within the substation and 
between the substation and the control center. Therefore, this thesis includes the proposed 
system architecture, which specifies data management, communication protocols, and the 
hierarchical structure of the system. Our design for this architecture complies with IEC-
 xx
61850 standard requirements. This compatibility is achieved by using the data objects, 
services, and communication protocols defined in the standard. Furthermore, we highlight 
the long-term goals of this approach: to support the next generation of energy management 
systems (EMSs), where the proposed system will provide the necessary data and real-time 
models to the control center for performing the usual control center functions such as state 
estimation, optimization, and control. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Power systems around the world are experiencing an evolution driven by the 
introduction of new energy resources, particularly renewable energy resources, power 
electronics conversion systems, and high-voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission. 
According to a recent forecast, renewable energy resources will make up around 31.2% of 
the total world power generation by 2035 [1], [2]. Moreover, around 50% of these resources 
will come from wind and solar energy [1]. This massive deployment of new energy 
resources has already led to several changes in power system characteristics, including 
reduced fault current levels [3], increased dynamics, and wider-frequency variations of 
disturbances. Such changes impose new challenges and mandate new approaches to deal 
with the different aspects of the power system, one of which is the protection and control 
of the power system. 
Another challenge faced by utility companies is to boost system reliability, a goal to 
which they have devoted tremendous effort. However, such efforts could be undermined 
by improper operations, or “misoperations,” of conventional protection systems. 
Therefore, such misoperations must be avoided by designing a reliable protection system. 
This reliability is defined by two fundamental characteristics: dependability and security 
[4], [5]. The term dependability is defined in IEEE C37-100-1992 as “The facet of 
reliability that relates to the degree of certainty that a relay or relay system will operate 
correctly.” This definition implies that dependability describes the ability of the relay to 
accurately respond to abnormalities within its protection zone in a timely manner. The term 
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security is defined in IEEE C37-100-1992 standard as “That facet of reliability that relates 
to the degree of certainty that a relay or relay system will not operate incorrectly.” This 
definition indicates that security describes the relay’s immunity to operate during a fault 
outside its protection zone. In fact, dependability and security are competing characteristics 
of any protection system because a highly dependable system might result in an insecure 
system, and vice versa. Accordingly, protection engineers must consider a tradeoff between 
dependability and security during the overall design of protection systems. Despite all the 
efforts exerted by protection engineers to design a reliable protection system and the 
development in protective devices, relay misoperations are still occurring with significant 
frequency. These misoperations are the reasons for approximately 10% of total power 
system interruptions, as reported by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(NERC) [6]. In many cases, these misoperations lead to wide power system disturbances 
and even blackouts, such as the one that occurred recently in southern California [7]. To 
analyze these concerns in all of its regions, NERC formed the national Protection System 
Misoperation Task Force (PSMTF), which collects and analyzes relay operations [6]. 
Figure 1-1 shows recently released statistics pertaining to relay operations; around 65% of 
misoperations are caused by settings/logic errors, relay instrumentation channels, and 
communications failures. The common characteristic of these problems is that they remain 
hidden until they are exposed by an event in the network, such as a power fault condition 
[7]. This characteristic increases the complexity of the problem because it introduces 
several contingences into a system designed in most cases to handle only one contingency. 
These types of hidden failures remain a critical gap that jeopardizes the reliability of 
 3
protection systems. Therefore, overcoming these challenges requires a new philosophy in 
power system protection based on the latest developments in technology.  
  
Figure 1-1 Statistics of relay misoperations [6]. 
Technological advancements have played a major role in paving the way for a new 
protection system capable of overcoming present-day challenges. Specifically, the 
introduction of merging units, advancements in computational capabilities and the 
communication infrastructure as well as availability of related standards enable the 
realization of centralized approaches for supervision of protective functions and self-
healing and self-correction of the effects of hidden failures. The introduction of IEC 61850 
provides a blueprint to allow IEDs from various manufacturers to seamlessly participate in 
new protection schemes. Data transfer within the substation has been standardized for any 
application [8], [9]. The standard introduces a new approach to interface the instrument 
transformers with all protection and control devices within the substation. This new 
approach entails separating the analog-to-digital conversion modules from the IED to 
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stand-alone devices called merging units (MUs). IEC 61850-9-1 defines the MU as “an 
interface unit that accepts multiple analogue CT/VT and binary inputs and produces 
multiple time synchronized serial unidirectional multi-drop digital point to point outputs to 
provide data communication via the logical interfaces.” The separation of the D/A modules 
by introducing MUs facilitates the introduction of a substation-centralized protection 
scheme using off-the-shelf hardware [9]. Such hardware is a standard computer 
characterized by high computational capabilities to process massive data streaming from 
the MUs. Finally, this realization of the substation-centralized protection scheme will not 
be possible without advancement in time-synchronization technology using the precision 
time protocol (PTP) as per IEEE 1588-2008. 
1.2 Research Objective  
The evolution in power systems, the risk of relay misoperation because of hidden 
failures, and the technology advancement have driven us to propose a new substation-
centralized protection scheme secured against hidden failures. The objective of this 
research is to design a dynamic state estimation-based centralized protection scheme 
(DSEBCPS) to increase protection system security and dependability. The DSEBCPS 
supervises the dynamic state estimation-based protective relays for individual zones, 
known as “settingless protection” [9]; detects hidden failures; and corrects compromised 
data resulting from hidden failures. Settingless protective relays are an emerging concept 
in protection that can be applied reliably to any power system device, including power 
electronic devices. The proposed centralized protection scheme, along with settingless 
relays, forms a resilient substation-centralized protection system capable of mitigating the 
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limitation in conventional protection systems, including the protection of power 
electronic–based systems and the capability of detecting hidden failures. 
Critical to this work is the ability to manage the data and communication among 
various devices (MUs, settingless relays, DSEBCPS) within the substation and between 
the substation and the control center. Therefore, we defined the details of the system 
architecture, which specifies data management, communication protocols, and the 
hierarchical structure of the system. Currently, there are worldwide efforts to design the 
architecture of the digital substation, and we hope this research will make a significant 
contribution toward this goal.   
1.3 Thesis Outline 
The following chapters include the details of the DSEBCPS. Specifically, the 
dissertation consists of eight chapters divided as follows: Chapter 2 provides a brief review 
of the literature and other background information associated with the proposed research 
topic. Chapter 3 discusses the impact of hidden failures in different components of 
protection systems. The overall concept of the DSEBCPS is introduced in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 explains the mathematical formulation of every module within the DSEBCPS. 
In Chapter 6, we demonstrate the capability of the DSEBCPS in detecting hidden failures 
in real time through numerical experiments. This chapter includes the results of five cases 
of hidden failures: (1) PT blown fuse, (2) CT saturation, (3) CT short circuit, (4) CT reverse 
polarity, and (5) wrong CT ratio setting. Chapter 7 presents the proposed architectures for 
data management, communication with zone-level relays within the substation, and 
communication with the control center. This chapter introduces the proposed architecture 
for both grassroots installation and for an existing substation. It also highlights the long-
 6
term goals of this architecture to support the next generation of energy management 




CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief review of the literature and other background 
information associated with the proposed research topic. We first discuss the historical 
development of the centralized protection scheme. Then, we introduce the adaptive scheme 
implementation for hidden failures application. Finally, we discuss emerging concepts that 
can be employed in the centralized protection scheme. More specifically, the concepts of 
settingless relay and pattern recognition protection schemes are highlighted.  
2.2 Historical Development  
The development of centralized protection schemes began in 1980 [9]. One of the 
earliest efforts to develop such a system was the EPRI research project RP-1359, which 
addressed system requirements for the substation control and protection system developed 
by Westinghouse Electric Cooperation [9], [10], [11]. This system is an integrated 
protection system for transmission-level substations, which includes line, transformer, bus, 
shunt reactor, and breaker failure protections. Furthermore, the system includes control 
functions, system restoration aid, revenue metering, and a SCADA system. Two similar 
systems, the integrated modular protection and control system (IMPACS) and the hybrid 
system, were developed by American Electric Power (AEP) and ASEA, respectively [9].  
In 1992, Ontario Hydro developed the integrated protection and control system 
(IPACS), a computer system designed for protection, control, and monitoring [9]. It was a 
centralized system using a single CPU that provided a protection system for transformer 
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stations. It provided protection for the protection zones of typical transformer stations such 
as transformers, buses, and feeders. Additionally, the system provided metering and 
SCADA functions. It was deployed to around 56 substations. In 1994, GE and North West 
utility in Spain developed SIPSUR, which is a centralized protection scheme for medium 
voltage (MV) distribution substations. This system combined the protection schemes of 
two incomers, one transformer, and five feeders into a central platform [9], [12].    
In 2000, a centralized protection system was developed by Vattenfalls Eldistribution 
in cooperation with ABB [9], [13]. The system was developed for control and protection 
of HVDC substations and included several conventional AC protection functions. The 
system was deployed at five different substations. It used the industrial computers of that 
time. Each computer was connected to set of I/O modules with processor cards for digital 
and analog input and output data.  
The aforementioned systems managed to integrate both control and protection 
functions into microprocessor-based devices. These systems provided more monitoring 
and control capabilities that improved the operational aspects of the system. However, they 
were replicas of the legacy protection functions without additional algorithms to enhance 
protection-system security. Therefore, these systems were vulnerable to hidden failures, 
which affected their overall security.   
2.3 Adaptive Scheme-Based Centralized Protection Scheme  
During the last two decades, relay manufacturers and researchers have addressed 
some specific issues related to hidden failures. They have proposed several protection 
schemes that minimize the effects of hidden failures. Most of these schemes employ the 
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concept of adaptive protection schemes, which increase the security of protection systems 
[14]–[18]. Conceptually, adaptive schemes have the capability to automatically adjust the 
settings of the protection system according to system conditions. This type of scheme is 
defined in [16] as a scheme that “automatically adjusts the operating characteristics of the 
relay system in response to changes in power system conditions.”  
One example of an adaptive scheme is the blocking scheme, which can identify a 
faulty zone by monitoring the pickup of all relays that see the fault. Then the scheme blocks 
the relays not located in the faulty zone, as illustrated in Figure 2-1. The authors of [17], 
[19] demonstrated that the blocking signal can be sent in less than 20 ms, which is more 
than fast enough to block backup relays. The introduction of GOOSE messages facilitates 
the implementation of the blocking scheme without additional hardware requirements. The 
blocking scheme increases the security of the protection system by eliminating the 
operation of the relays outside the faulty zone. However, the system is vulnerable to hidden 
failures in instrumentation channels. For example, a hidden failure of a CT short circuit in 
CT2 in Figure 2-1 will cause the nonoperation of Relay-2 in response to a fault in its zone. 
Accordingly, Relay-1 will sense the fault and operate. A similar scenario will result if the 
setting of Relay-2 is not adequate to detect the fault. Moreover, the scheme complexity 
increases with the complexity of the system topology. This complexity might lead to errors 
in developing the overall logic of the blocking scheme. 
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Figure 2-1 Example of blocking scheme. 
A widely used adaptive scheme is the voting scheme, which capitalizes on the fact 
that each protection zone and its backup consist of several relays. The objective of the 
voting scheme is to increase the security of protection systems by involving several relays 
located within a protection zone to make final relay decisions [15], [17], [20], [21]. Usually, 
such a scheme is initiated under certain power system conditions such as heavy load 
conditions, which require a very secure protection system to avoid relay misoperation. A 
simple example of a voting scheme is shown in Figure 2.-2, which shows a transmission 
line with one set of protective relays used to protect the line. Typically, these relays are a 
differential relay (R1), distance relay (R2), and directional relay (R3). Usually, the line has 
another set of similar relays at each side to provide backup protection. The voting scheme 
implemented in this example is known as a two-out-of-three voting scheme, which 
demands two relays to see the fault and operate in order to initiate a trip signal and isolate 
the line. The initiation of the scheme depends on the system’s condition, such as a heavy 
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load condition; otherwise, each relay operates independently [22]. These conditions need 
to be predefined based on comprehensive power system studies. A more advanced voting 
scheme with a real-time intelligent fuzzy factor has been proposed [15]. The objective of 
this scheme is to overcome any uncertainty in the relay’s decision. 
The voting scheme has several disadvantages that could jeopardize protection system 
security. A main disadvantage is that the relays used in the voting scheme are vulnerable 
to hidden failures that might cause relay misoperation. In the given example, a hidden 
failure in the instrumentation channel PT-1 affects the voltage inputs of relays R2 and R3 
and might lead them to misoperate. Moreover, the scheme is complex and subjected to 
several uncertainties such as operating conditions that initiate the scheme.  
 
Figure 2-2 Example of voting scheme in transmission line protection.  
Adaptive schemes have been employed in several centralized protection schemes. 
One of these systems is the strategic power infrastructure defense (SPID), a wide-area 
scheme that employs a multi-agent system to assess power system vulnerability and take 
proper defensive actions, as shown in Figure 2-3 [23]–[25]. The aim of the system is to 
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increase power system security and avoid catastrophic failures caused by the various 
sources of vulnerability. The key concept of this system is to secure power system through 
a comprehensive wide-area vulnerability assessment. SPID provides a defense against 
hidden failures in its protection scheme through adapting the concepts of an adaptive 
protection scheme. This is achieved by implementing the blocking and voting schemes 
described earlier. Moreover, the system can activate different setting groups within the 
relays as the system configuration changes.  
 
Figure 2-3 The SPID system [25]. 
Another centralized protection system that employs the adaptive scheme is the 
hidden failure and monitoring and control scheme (HFMCS) proposed in [26],[27]. It is a 
substation-based, wide-area system that employs a voting scheme to minimize the effect 
of hidden failures. This system, which monitors protection systems for hidden failure 
detection, aims to increase protection system security as a response to power system 
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vulnerability. The system architecture consists of three main modules interacting with each 
other, as shown in Figure 2-4. These modules are hidden failure monitoring, hidden failure 
control, and the misoperation tracking database. The hidden failure monitoring module 
allows additional controls to be initiated. It monitors the IEDs in a substation and collects 
the alarms related to the protection system. Moreover, it monitors power system topology 
to identify any stressed power system conditions. The hidden failure control module 
employs a voting scheme to minimize the effect of hidden failures. Upon receiving a 
triggering signal from hidden failure monitoring modules, it will activate the voting 
scheme. The misoperation tracking database module serves as a database of all hidden 
failures that take place within the system.  
 
Figure 2-4 HFMCS modules [28]. 
Another system worth mentioning that uses the adaptive scheme is the relay 
supervisory system (RSS), an advanced supervisory system proposed in [29]. This system 
takes advantage of the latest IED technology and the newly established standard (IEC-
61850) to develop a new condition-based maintenance philosophy and reduce risks from 
hidden failures. It supervises all the IEDs in the substations through the station and process 
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bus, as shown in Figure 2.5. Once the RSS receives an alarm from an IED or detects a 
failure, it activates the adaptive scheme.  
 
Figure 2-5 RSS architecture [29]. 
The aforementioned solutions are conceptual, and none has yet been deployed in an 
actual system due to practical considerations. These systems employ the adaptive scheme 
to increase the security of the protection system. However, the adaptive scheme has several 
drawbacks. For one, it depends on IEDs and their instrumentation channels and lacks a 
mechanism that verifies their accuracy. It is also contingency based, which means that its 
operation depends on predefined contingencies. However, because the scheme cannot 
handle all possible contingencies that it may encounter in an actual system, it is incomplete. 
Furthermore, it is extremely complex, requiring a communication system and several relays 
operating at the same time to confirm the final relay decision. To find the most optimal 
algorithm, its implementation requires intensive and comprehensive study (i.e. power flow, 
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short circuit, and transient analyses) beyond normal study to identify each relay’s behavior 
at each fault condition. Finally, this scheme does not have a uniform algorithm because it 
mainly depends on the type and number of relays, which are system specific. Thus, the 
degree of complexity and the lack of standardization may be another source of hidden 
failures. 
2.4 Emerging Concept  
Recently, researchers have proposed new approaches to providing protections. This 
section presents two promising techniques: state estimation–based protection schemes and 
pattern classification–based protection schemes.  
2.4.1 State Estimation–Based Protection Schemes (Settingless Relay) 
The idea of settingless protection was inspired by the differential protection function. 
It requires minimal settings, and what is most important is that it does not require 
coordination with other protective relay functions [30]. Differential protection monitors 
Kirchoff’s current law, which states that the sum of the currents going into a device must 
equal zero when the device operates normally (unfaulted). Similarly, settingless protection 
relays monitor all physical laws the device under protection must satisfy when it operates 
normally (unfaulted). This monitoring is accomplished by performing dynamic state 
estimation (DSE), which continuously compares the collected measurements (sampled 
values) to the dynamic model of the device under protection (protection zone) and provides 
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a quantitative assessment of how well the data fit the dynamic model [30]–[34]. DSE 
quantifies the goodness of fit between the measurements and the device model by applying 
the chi-square test, which calculates the probability that the measurements fit the model. 
The chi-square test typically returns a probability of >80% for healthy protection zones and 
<80% for a protection zone with any type of fault inside the zone [30]– [36]. Figure 2-6 
shows the overall logic of DSE-based protection [37]. Given an accurate dynamic model 
of the protection zone, the performance of the settingless relays is very secure and 
dependable. They are immune to normal transient events or external disturbances, such as 
inrush current in transformers and transient currents in capacitor banks [36]–[39].  
 
Figure 2-6 Settingless relay overall concept [37]. 
The settingless relays acquire the measurements of the protection zones from the 
MUs via a process bus. Similarly, all relay decisions are communicated back to the 
breakers via the process bus. Using MUs has the advantage of minimizing the 
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instrumentation cabling in the substation, which reduces instrumentation errors. Therefore, 
the accuracy of the data acquisition system depends mainly on instrumentation 
transformers. Moreover, the MU is characterized by a high sampling rate, a typical value 
being 4,800 samples/s. This sampling rate allows us to perform DSE 2,400 times per 
second [36]. This time performance results in detecting the fault in a small fraction of a 
cycle, which is superior to any existing technology. It is worthwhile to mention that the 
computational requirements of this proposed scheme are within the computational 
capabilities of modern microprocessors. The current implementation uses two cores of the 
processor for each protection zone in the substation, one dedicated to the execution of the 
DSE and the other for handling user interfaces and visualizations of the performance of the 
protection zone. The settingless relays for the various protection zones in a substation are 
integrated into a substation-centralized scheme, as illustrated in Figure 2-7. 
  
Figure 2-7 Settingless relay architecture. 
The settingless relays are vulnerable to hidden failures, similar to any other relaying 
scheme. Such failures could affect the performance of any relay. Hence, a mechanism to 
detect such failures is essential for reliable protection of power system components. Figure 
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2-7 shows that instrumentation channels are the elements of the system most vulnerable to 
hidden failures. Such failures result in inaccurate measurements going to the settingless 
relays, which will cause misoperation. Therefore, a mechanism to detect such failures is 
needed for secure operation. 
2.4.2 Pattern Classification–Based Protection Schemes 
The pattern classification scheme relies mainly on the concept of translational 
knowledge, which is defined as “a set of procedures that allow[s] field data to be merged 
with models to produce better decision-making” [40]. It involves converting data to 
information that is mapped to different types of models. Each model fits certain 
applications that can be used to create knowledge to take proper control actions. For 
protection applications, the pattern classification uses the well-known technique of the 
neural network (NN)[40]–[43]. The concept of an NN-based protective relaying approach 
is to define a cluster of patterns through an intensive learning process of the system under 
investigation and match the pattern of system information (i.e., measurements) to a unique 
cluster, as illustrated in Figure 2-8. This process requires NN training and testing, which 
requires intensive analysis to characterize the system and generate the pattern clusters. 
Accordingly, a large number of fault and nonfault cases are required to accomplish the 
process of training and testing for reliable operation of the algorithm. These test cases are 
mainly generated from simulation to include all possible scenarios. The identification of 
the testing cases depends on the power system device under protection because each device 
in the power system has different characteristics and is subjected to different phenomena.  
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The technique is vulnerable to hidden failures, like any other relaying scheme. These 
failures could generate incorrect input data and drive the protection system to misoperate. 
Furthermore, the system requires intensive studies to develop predefined patterns from the 
collected inputs. Such requirements could result in incomplete system which is incapable 
of detecting all faulty conditions. 
 
Figure 2-8 NN-based protective relaying approach [42]. 
2.5 Summary 
The concept of a centralized protection scheme was introduced in the 1980s when 
several centralized protection schemes were introduced. These systems combined the 
conventional protection system and control functions into a central platform for more 
controllability. However, these systems were vulnerable to hidden failures because they 
were not equipped with any additional algorithms to detect such failures. To improve 
protection systems’ security against hidden failures, adaptive protection schemes were 
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introduced. The adaptive scheme has the capability to automatically adjust the settings of 
the protection system according to system conditions. A common approach of the adaptive 
scheme is the voting scheme, which includes several protection relays before initiating a 
trip signal. In general, the adaptive scheme has several drawbacks, such as its complexity 
and its vulnerability to hidden failures in instrumentation channels. 
The advancement in the technology enables the introduction of emerging concepts such 
as state estimation–based protection schemes and pattern classification–based protection 
schemes. The estimation-based protection scheme called a settingless relay is a model-
based protection that continually monitors the consistency between the measurements and 
the zone model. Like the legacy protection system, the settingless relay is vulnerable to 
hidden failures in the instrumentation channels. Resolving such vulnerability will make the 
settingless relay a superior protection system in terms of security and dependability 
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CHAPTER 3. HIDDEN FAILURES  
3.1 Introduction 
Hidden failures have been defined as “permanent defects that will cause a relay or 
a relay system to incorrectly and inappropriately remove a circuit element(s) as a direct 
consequence of another switching event” [26]. One characteristic of these problems is that 
they remain hidden (undetected) until an abnormal condition such as a fault occurs.  During 
such condition, hidden failures may provide incorrect input for IEDs, which may result in 
misoperation and initiation of more contingencies by isolating a healthy portion of the 
power system. Accordingly, they might widen power system interruptions and lead to a 
catastrophic scenario, such as a total blackout. Therefore, hidden failures jeopardize 
protection system security.  
A typical protection system shown in Figure 3-1 comprises protective relays, 
instrumentation channels, (i.e. current transformers (CTs) and potential transformers 
(PTs)), communication infrastructure, circuits breakers, and batteries [29]. Each 
component is vulnerable to hidden failures that might cause protection system 
misoperation. However, protective relays and instrumentation channels are more 
vulnerable to hidden failures because of their massive population in the substations. This 
chapter discusses hidden failure modes of different components and their potential impact 
on the protection system. It starts with protective relays vulnerability to hidden failures. 
Then it briefly discusses common hidden failure modes in the communication layers. 
Finally, hidden failure modes in the instrumentation channels are discussed.   
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Figure 3-1 Typical protection scheme [29]. 
3.2 Hidden Failure Modes in Protective Relays  
The protective relays are the watchdog of the power system. They are capable of 
processing data received from the instrumentation channels (i.e., currents and voltages 
measurements) and detecting abnormal conditions in the power system. These protective 
relays have evolved drastically over the last three decades from electromechanical-based 
devices to microprocessor-based devices. The microprocessor-based devices have also 
been developed to include communication and automation functions along with protection 
functions and, therefore, they are referred to as intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) [9]. 
Hidden failures in IEDs can be classified into three categories (a) hardware-related hidden 
failures, (b) setting-related hidden failures, and (c) relay logic-related hidden failures. The 
following paragraphs discuss each of these classes briefly  [44]. 
Figure 3-2 shows the typical hardware structure of IEDs, which include signal 
conditioning to handle the transients and spikes in the signal, an analog-to-digital (A/D) 
converter, a processor to process the input and perform the IED functions, I/O module to 
receive and send digital signals, and a power supply module [45]. These components might 
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fail mainly because of either aging or manufacturer defects. Such failures could lead to 
relay misoperation by initiating a trip signal during healthy condition or relay nonoperation 
during faulty conditions. Most IED vendors have implemented self-testing capabilities 
within their IEDs [46], [47]. Such self-testing is meant to verify the condition of different 
components in the IED. This includes verifying that the voltage of the DC power supply is 
within an acceptable range, checking its ability to access the memory of the processor, and 
validating the A/D conversion. Upon detecting a failure through the self-check, the IED 
sends an alarm to the control center and deactivates itself automatically. However, the self-
check process does not cover the physical I/O modules, which can fail physically (i.e., 
shorted) and initiate the wrong trip signal to the circuit breaker. This type of failure can’t 
be stopped once it is initiated; nevertheless, a good maintenance program reduces the 
probability of its occurrence.   
 
Figure 3-2 The overall structure of IEDs. 
Incorrect settings or logic are the most common modes of hidden failures in IEDs, 
according to NERC [6]. Such failures are, in most cases, related to human factors, 
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represented by the protection engineers and technicians who calculate and implement the 
relay settings. This issue has become more observable recently as the degree of complexity 
in IEDs has increased because protection, control, and automation have been combined in 
one box. This type of hidden failure is critical because it might cause wide power system 
interruptions during the healthy condition of the affected zone. An example of such failures 
in the legacy protection system is relay miscoordination, as illustrated in Figure 3-3, which 
shows relay-A, located in the upper stream portion of a system, operates faster than relay-
B, which is located in the downstream portion, during a fault in the relay-B zone. 
Accordingly, relay-A initiates a trip signal to breaker-A, which leads to power interruptions 
for all customers supplied by this system. To avoid the risk of relay misoperation because 
of incorrect relay settings and logic, many actions have been proposed such as relay settings 
peer reviews, more training for protection engineers, and relay setting templates 
standardization. Furthermore, the emerging concept of settingless relays addressed the risk 
of incorrect relay settings by reducing the required setting of the relay and, more 
importantly, eliminating the need for relay coordination.  
 
Figure 3-3  Example of relay miscoordination. 
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3.3 Hidden Failure Modes in Communication Channels   
In the era of the smart grid, communication systems have become an integral part 
of protection systems. These communication systems have massive applications, such as 
communication between differential relays, transfer blocking, permissive and tripping 
signals, and the transfer of current and voltage inputs from merging units. With such 
massive applications, however, communication systems could suffer from hidden failures, 
which might cause relay misoperations. The common hidden failure modes in 
communication systems include failures in communication media (i.e., fiber optic cables) 
and communication interfaces (i.e., routers) [48]. These failures result in the loss of 
information from the remote ends, which causes a loss of controllability and observability. 
In legacy protection systems, transmission line protection is the most vulnerable system to 
hidden failures in communication channels because it employs several communication-
based protection schemes, such as differential scheme and a permissive 
overreach/underreach transfer trip scheme. These schemes rely mainly on the 
communication channels, and they might misoperate during communication failures. In 
newly emerged digital substations, the entire protection system for all protection zones in 
a substation relies heavily on communication. Accordingly, every protection zone is 
vulnerable to hidden failures in the communication channels. However, this vulnerability 
is captured in the design of the communication system. Such design entails redundant 
communication infrastructure. Subsequently, a failure in a communication channel will not 
impact the integrity of the protection system. Moreover, the design includes initiating an 
alarm to the control center whenever a communication channel is lost. These design criteria 
are available in both legacy and emerging protection systems. 
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3.4 Hidden Failure Modes in Instrumentation Channels   
The instrumentation channels in protection systems consist of instrumentation 
transformers, instrumentation cables, and burdens. They represent the front line of the 
protection systems, and they act as the interphase between the primary devices (i.e., HV 
power system devices) and the IEDs, which require a relatively low current and voltage to 
operate [49], [50]. The instrumentation transformers step down the voltage and current to 
lower values (typically 1 or 5A for CTs and 69V for PTs). These voltages and currents are 
supplied to the IED through instrumentation cables. Moreover, the IEDs are equipped with 
A/D conversion units to convert the collected measurements to digital signals before they 
are processed. Recently, the A/D conversion has been separated from the IEDs with the 
introduction of merging units (MU), which substantially reduce the amount of 
instrumentation cabling [45]. Figure 3-4 shows typical instrumentation channels with and 
without MUs. Figure 3-4b suggests that instrument transformers are the most vulnerable 
elements to hidden failures in the instrumentation channels because the MUs have almost 
eliminated the instrumentation cables. Moreover, the loss of communication between the 
IEDs and the MUs results in data flow interruption, which can usually be detected by the 
IEDs. Also, the redundancy in the fiber optic infrastructure minimizes the risk of 
communication loss. Accordingly, hidden failures in the instrumentation transformers 
remain a gap that needs to be investigated to improve the security of the protection systems. 
The following subsections discuss the common modes of hidden failures in CTs and PTs 
as well as their impact on the legacy protection systems. Furthermore, this research focuses 
on these hidden failures to develop an overall scheme that can detect hidden failures and 
secure protections system operations.    
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Figure 3-4 Instrumentation channels: (a) conventional; (b) recent approach with MU.  
  
3.4.1 Hidden Failure Modes in Current Transformers  
Current transformers (CTs) are instrument transformers used to measure the current 
waveforms of the protected zone and step them down to values that can be handled by the 
IEDs. They are typically based on magnetic core design and characterized by their ratio 
and accuracy class [51]. CT ratio is the ratio of the rated primary current to the rated 
secondary current, which is typically 5A or 1A. CT accuracy class defines the maximum 
permissible voltage that can be developed on CT burden before saturation takes place [52]. 
ANSI C57.13-1978 defines the following two types of CT accuracy based on the 
application: 
 Metering accuracy class used for application that require a high degree of accuracy, 
such as revenue meters. An example of this class is “0.3 B 0.2,” which means that 
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at 0.2 ohm burden and rated secondary current (i.e., 5A or 1A), the CT accuracy is 
0.3% [53], [54]. 
 Relaying accuracy class for protection application. In this application, the relay 
accuracy is identified at 20 times of the rated current [53]. An example of this 
accuracy is “10 C 800,” which means that at a standard burden and a fault current 
of 20 times the CT secondary rating (i.e., 100A or 20A), the CT secondary voltage 
that will be developed is 800V, and the accuracy of the CT at this condition is 10%. 
Usually, CT will saturate beyond this condition. 
The CT circuits, which are shown in Figure 3-5, are vulnerable to hidden failures. 
Such failures will cause the IED to inaccurately read current waveform and misoperate. 
For this research, the CT mathematical model, which is included in Appendix 1, has been 
developed to simulate and analyze the following common hidden failures modes: (1) CT 
saturation, (2) CT short circuit, (3) wrong CT polarity, and (4) wrong CT ratio settings.  
 
Figure 3-5 CT equivalent circuit. 
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3.4.1.1. CT Saturation 
 The CT saturation is one of the most common hidden failure modes in the CT 
circuit. It is caused by the nonlinear behavior of the magnetic core. The nonlinearity is 
depicted in the relationship between magnetizing current (im) and the magnetic flux density 
( ( )t ), as per the following relation: 
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Figure 3-6 depicts the relationship between the magnetizing curve and the 
secondary voltage [49], [55]. The figure shows that the relationship is linear for a secondary 
voltage less than the knee voltage, which is generally defined “as the voltage at which a 
further 10% increase in volts at the secondary side of the CT requires more than 50% 
increase in excitation current.”[56] Moreover, the relationship becomes nonlinear when the 
secondary voltage exceeds the knee voltage. In the nonlinear region, the magnetization 
current increases substantially for a small increase in the voltage. Accordingly, the 
secondary current of the CT will not be a replica of the primary current. Figure 3-7 shows 
a typical waveform of a saturated CT, which is a distorted waveform with a lower 
magnitude than that of the original waveform [55].   
There are four main factors that cause CT saturation; (a) high fault current, (b) high 
CT burden, (c) large DC offset during fault current, and (d) high percentage of remanence 
[56]. The high fault current and the high CT burden cause the voltage across the burden to 
increase substantially during the fault condition. This voltage might exceed the knee 
voltage and drive the CT into the saturation region. The DC offset component increases 
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the positive half cycles of the secondary voltage that might exceed the knee voltage. The 
remanence, which is also called residual flux, is the magnetic flux that remains from the 
previous excitation process. It will add up to the magnetic flux induced by the primary 
current and could push the core into the saturation region.  
 
Figure 3-6 CT excitation curve [55]. 
 
Figure 3-7 Typical waveform of a saturated CT [55]. 
The saturated CT results in current waveform, which does not replicate the primary 
current. In particular, the magnitude of the phasor quantity decreases during the CT 
saturation as shown in Figure 3-7. Moreover, the angle becomes leading [55], [56]. 
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Consequently, all current-based legacy protection devices are vulnerable to misoperation 
during the CT saturation. For example, Figure 3-8 depicts the response of the transformer 
(i.e., 100 MVA, 230kV/115kV) differential relay with CT saturation in the secondary side 
during external ground fault at phase A on the 115 kV side. The figure shows that the CT 
saturation led to a substantial increase in the differential element, which causes the relay to 
operate and isolate a healthy transformer. This simulation assumes that there are no CT 
saturation detection algorithm implemented to secure the relay operation. This example of 
the CT saturation impact on differential relays can be extended to all types of current-based 
legacy protection relays. The impact can take the form of relay misoperation or relay 
nonoperation during an event that requires the relay to operate.  
 
Figure 3-8 Example of the impact of CT saturation on transformer differential 
protection.   
 Researchers and relay manufactures have proposed several algorithms to detect CT 
saturation and inhibit relay operations [57].  Most of these algorithms detect CT saturation 
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techniques have been also proposed such as wave shape identification and flux-restrained 
current differential relay [57]. These techniques mainly block the relay operation or 
desensitize the relay upon detecting saturation. Their main disadvantage is that their 
capability to detect the CT saturation is significantly reduced at lower levels of saturation. 
Additionally, these techniques are also subjected to hidden failures such as improper setting 
to the CT saturation algorithm. Moreover, their philosophy depends on increasing relay 
security in the expense of the dependability because during the detection the affected relays 
will be disabled or desensitized.    
3.4.1.2 CT Short Circuit 
CT short circuit takes place when the CT terminals are shorted. It may take place 
because of a short circuit event in the instrumentation cables of the CT resulting from a 
transient surge in the system or poor workmanship during the construction phase of the 
substation. Also, it might take place following human error during maintenance activities. 
In both cases, the CT terminals are shorted as shown in Figure 3-9. Consequently, the 
protective devices connected to the CT will not receive the actual CT secondary current. 
This might result in the nonoperation of some relays, such as the simple overcurrent relay, 
during severe fault conditions that require the relay to operate instantaneously. Also, it 
might cause the relay to misoperate for some relays, such as differential relays and distance 
relays, during external faults. Figure 3-10 shows the impact of a CT short circuit in a simple 
ground overcurrent relay (i.e., R2, 51/50 G) for a distribution line during a ground fault in 
the line. The figure shows that the relay did not operate and caused the upper stream relay 
(R1, 51N) to operate after a delay and isolate a larger portion of the system.    
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Figure 3-9 CT short circuit model. 
 
Figure 3-10 Example of the impact of a CT short circuit on overcurrent relay. 
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3.4.1.3. CT Reverse Polarity 
The CT polarity is identified using the dot convention, as shown in Figure 3-11. 
This convention indicates that if the primary current flows into the dot of the primary side, 
then the current must flow out of the dot on the secondary side. Similarly, if the current in 
the primary side flows out of the dot, the current flows into the dot on the secondary side. 
Usually, the manufacturers use this convention through either paint marks or symbol marks 
(i.e., H1 and H2 for primary and X1 and X2 for secondary) to identify the polarity [58]. 
These markings are used to connect the CT based on the requirements of each application.   
 
Figure 3-11 CT polarity convention.  
CT reverse polarity occurs when the CT terminals are reversed in the relay 
terminals or in the terminal blocks, which causes the current waveform in the secondary 
side to be 180 degrees out of phase with the primary current. This type of hidden failure 
results in relay misoperation for the protective functions that are sensitive to CT polarity, 
such as differential relays, distance relays, and directional relays. Usually, such hidden 
failure takes place because of poor workmanship during maintenance or pre-
commissioning activities. Also, CT reverse polarity might exist for a long time until a fault 
occurs in the system or an increment in the load takes place, causing the relay to misoperate. 
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Figure 3-12 illustrates the impact of the CT reverse polarity in the operation of the 100 
MVA, 230kV/115kV transformer differential relay during an increment in the transformer 
load from no load condition to 30% of its rating. In this example, the polarity of the CT in 
the secondary side of the transformer is reversed. Figure 3-12 shows that the differential 
element’s current represents the vector sum of the primary and secondary currents read 
from the CTs. Subsequently, the relay operated and initiated a trip signal to isolate the 
transformer because of the reverse polarity. This example illustrates the negative impact of 
hidden failures on power system operations. This impact can also be seen in the operation 
of the directional relay, where CT reverse polarity will always reverse the direction of the 
current and cause the relay to operate during external faults.    
 
 Figure 3-12 Example of CT reverse polarity. 
3.4.1.4 Wrong CT Ratio Setting  
The relay requires the correct CT ratio setting to replicate the precise primary 
current. The CT wrong ratio is one of the hidden failure modes that takes place during relay 
setting implementation or calculation. Protection engineers might consider the wrong 
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setting of the CT ratio during the setting calculation. Also, technicians might implement 
the wrong CT ratio during setting implementation. In the legacy protection system, the 
impact of the wrongly implemented CT ratio is mainly to the wrongly calculated primary 
waveform, which might disturb the metering function within the relay. Also, considering 
the wrong CT ratio during setting calculation might result in an inaccurate setting. 
Consequently, the relay might either misoperate during normal condition and an external 
fault or not operate during an internal fault. Figure 3-13 shows an example of the calculated 
primary current using the wrong CT ratio for two cases (i.e., a higher ratio of 3000/5 and a 
lower ratio of 1000/5). In this example, the correct CT ratio is 2000/5. The example shows 
the difference between the calculated primary currents, considering the correct and wrong 
ratio could be substantial.     
 
Figure 3-13 Example of the impact of using wrong CT ratio to calculate the primary 
current. 
3.4.2 Hidden Failure Modes in Potential Transformers (PT)  
Potential transformers (PT) are instrument transformers that are used to stepdown 
the system voltage to a level that can be handled by protective devices or meters. PTs are 
usually single phase transformers that are connected in three phases. The most common 
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The selection criteria for connection methods mainly depend on the application and 
economic considerations. The Y-Y connection is used in the HV application more often, 
while the open delta connection is used more frequently in the distribution network. Delta-
delta connections are less common because open delta connections are more economical 
with two PTs, compared with three PTs in the delta-delta connection. Moreover, delta-
connected PTs are not suitable for some protection applications, such as directional 
overcurrent relays that need a polarizing voltage [59]. Furthermore, Delta-Y connection is 
used in some application especially in transmission substations.    
  
Figure 3-14 Typical connection methods for potential transformers [59]. 
 
Figure 3-15 shows the PT circuit, which consists of a primary fuse, internal 
winding, secondary fuses, instrumentation cable, and a burden. Every component in this 
circuit is subjected to hidden failures, like any component in the protection circuit. These 
hidden failures can result in inaccurate voltage readings in the protective devices and may 
cause relay misoperation. The primary and secondary fuses protect the PT circuit during 
abnormal conditions. These fuses get blown when the current in the PT circuit exceeds the 
fuse rating because of an internal fault or overload conditions. Moreover, the fuse might 
be blown due to under sizing, transients, or harmonic resonance [60]. Additionally, most 
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failures in the PT circuit will eventually lead to blown fuses. Therefore, blown fuses are 
considered the most common mode of hidden failures in the PT circuit. Accordingly, we 
have modeled the PT circuit (Appendix 2) to analyze the impact of blown fuses in the 
protection system. Figure 3-16 shows an example of such impact on distance relay during 
phase to phase faults occurred outside 115 kV transmission line with length of 25 mile. 
Figure 3-16c shows the mho type distance relay characteristic on the R-X diagram with 
two points A and B that represent the calculated impedance by distance relay phase element 
(i.e. phase AB) with and without the blown fuse condition, respectively. The figure shows 
that the blown fuse caused the calculated impedance to fall within zone 1 setting, while the 
actual impedance during the event was within zone 2 setting. Accordingly, the relay might 
misoperate during this condition.  
The issue of the blown fuse was addressed by the loss of potential (LOP) scheme, 
which detects an unbalanced condition in the voltage measurements and compares it with 
the unbalanced condition in the current measurement [61]. If the unbalanced condition 
exists only in the voltage measurements, loss of potential, which might be caused by a 
blown fuse, is detected. Upon detecting such event, the affected protection schemes will 
be blocked. The main disadvantage of this scheme is that during fault conditions the 
unbalance will appear in both voltage and current measurements and accordingly the LOP 
will not detect the blown fuse condition.   
 
Figure 3-15 Typical potential transformers circuit. 
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Figure 3-16  Example of the impact of PT blown fuse on distance relay.  
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3.5   Summary   
Hidden failures in protection systems are defects that become apparent during 
switching and/or fault events in power system network and cause protection system to 
misoperate. They might widen power system interruption by isolating healthy portions of 
the power system. Each component in a protection system is vulnerable to hidden failures. 
However, the protective relays and the instrumentation channels are more vulnerable to the 
hidden failures due to their massive population in the substations. For the protective relays, 
the most common hidden failure modes are the incorrect setting and logic of the IEDs. For 
the instrumentation channels the most common hidden failures modes are blown fuse, CT 
saturation, CT short circuit, CT reverse polarity, and wrong CT ratio setting. These failures 
in the instrumentation channels cause the protective device to read incorrect measurement 
which might cause a relay misooperation or nonoperation for an external fault or an internal 









CHAPTER 4. PROPOSED RESEARCH  
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides an overview of the proposed dynamic sate estimation-based 
centralized protection scheme (DSEBCPS). The scheme name implies that it employs the 
dynamic state estimation approach to secure zone level protection system against hidden 
failure. The objective of the scheme is to continually monitor zone-level protection, detect 
hidden failures, and correct compromised data. We propose integrating the DSEBCPS with 
settingless relays to secure their operation against hidden failures. The DSEBCPS works 
along with the settingless relays to form a resilient protection system. We have 
implemented the proposed scheme in an object-oriented manner, which requires expressing 
the substation model and measurement model in the standard form known as the state and 
control algebraic quadratic companion form (SCAQCF). The substation model in the 
SCAQCF format is used directly by the dynamic state estimation algorithm, which is the 
main process in the proposed scheme.  
4.2 Overall Approach 
The DSEBCPS is a substation-centralized protection scheme that monitors zone-
level relays (i.e., settingless protection relays) in real time to secure their operation against 
potential hidden failures. As depicted in Figures 4-1 and 4-2, the DSEBCPS inside the 
dotted frame is a second layer that monitors the operation of all settingless relays in a 
substation. The DSEBCPS communicates with the settingless relays via the station bus and 
obtains essential information from each protection zone, such as phasor quantities and 
breaker and disconnect status. This information is processed by the DSEBCPS to extract 
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the substation topology and states. Specifically, the DSEBCPS performs dynamic state 
estimations in the quasi-dynamic domain at sampling rate defined by the user to detect any 
sort of abnormality within the substation. The DSEBCPS measures the consistency 
between the phasor quantities obtained from the settingless relays and the quasi-dynamic 
model of the substation. Any inconsistency between the measurements and the model is 
detected by performing the chi-square test, which computes the probability that the 
measurements fit the model [62], [63]. We refer to this probability as the “confidence level” 
[64]. A high confidence level (i.e., close to 1) indicates a healthy substation; lower values 
indicate a faulty one. It is vital to emphasize the object-oriented approach in our 
implementation of the DSEBCPS. Such an approach is depicted in Figure 4-2, which shows 
that the scheme is built through several objects, such as a substation model, measurement 
model, measurement definition, and dynamic state estimation algorithm.  
Upon detecting abnormalities in the substation through a low confidence level, an 
additional process is needed to distinguish whether this abnormality has resulted from a 
fault or hidden failure. For this purpose, we propose performing hypothesis testing, which 
entails identifying a set of suspicious measurements, removing them one at a time, and 
performing dynamic state estimation every time a suspicious measurement or set of 
suspicious measurements are removed.  If the removal process reveals a high confidence 
level, the eliminated suspicious measurements suffer from abnormalities. Moreover, if the 
suspicious measurements represent a complete zone (i.e., all of them are used to model the 
zone), a power fault is detected in the zone. Furthermore, if the suspect measurements do 
not represent the whole zone, hidden failure in the suspect measurement is detected. The 
effectiveness of the hypothesis testing depends on the level of redundancy in 
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measurements. Because all protective relays (i.e., settingless relays) stream their 
measurements to the DSEBCPS, the redundancy is quite high, typically 2,000% [36]. This 
means that the measurements are twenty times more than the number of states describing 
the operation of the substation. This high level of redundancy results in higher residuals 
(the error between the estimated and measured value) for the bad data and minimizes the 
possibility of bad measurements acting as leverage points [64], [65]. This property enables 
fast convergence of the hypothesis testing. The DSEBCPS classifies measurements with 
high residuals as suspect measurements [66]. Then it starts the removal process with the 
measurement (or set of measurements) of the highest residual(s). More details about 
hypothesis testing are presented in Chapter 5.  
Upon detecting hidden failures, the DSEBCPS computes the sampled values 
corresponding to the detected bad data to the settingless relay to replace the bad 
measurements. To facilitate this process, a delay of two cycles is introduced in the 
operation of the settingless relay. Upon replacing the bad measurements, the confidence 
level of the zone under protection recovers from its low level. Subsequently, the relay will 
not initiate a trip signal. Accordingly, the DSEBCPS increases the settingless relay’s 
security without jeopardizing the dependability. Figure 4-3 depicts the overall concept of 




Figure 4-1 DSEBCPS overall concept. 
 
Figure 4-2 DSEBCPS overall architecture. 
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Figure 4-3 Flow chart for the DSEBCPS overall concept. 
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4.3 Summary  
The DSEBCPS supervises the individual settingless relays to secure their operations 
against hidden failures. The process starts with data streaming from the settingless relay to 
the DSEBCPS, which processes the data by performing DSE. This process verifies the 
consistency between the measurements and the substation model. Upon detecting 
inconsistency through the chi-square test, the DSEBCPS performs hypothesis testing to 
detect hidden failures. Upon detecting hidden failures, the DSEBCPS initiates bad data 
replacement to secure the settingless relay from misoperation.  
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CHAPTER 5. SUBSTATION-CENTRALIZED PROTECTION 
SCHEME 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the mathematical formulation of the proposed centralized 
protection scheme. It starts with a discussion about the object-oriented approach used in 
our design, then moves on to the substation and measurement models. The modeling 
section is followed by the formulation of the dynamic state estimation that monitors the 
settingless relays and detects substation abnormality. Then hypothesis testing, which is 
used to further classify the abnormality as a faulty zone or hidden failure, is discussed in 
detail. Finally, we present the process of replacing the compromised measurement. 
5.2 Object-Oriented Approach  
The object-oriented approach is generally employed in developing a specific 
application by using the object oriented paradigm, which entails dividing the application 
into a set of objects that interact with each other to perform the overall function. This 
approach has many advantages, including that it will [67]:  
 Provide a unified syntax to each component of the proposed application, which 
supports larger-scale implementation. This advantage is depicted in our proposed 
DSEBCPS by defining several components: (1) substation model extraction, which 
reads an external file to extract the substation model; (2) measurement model 
development; (3) dynamic state estimation computation; (4) hypothesis testing; and 
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(5) bad data replacement. Each component has been designed to accommodate 
different substation designs.    
 Simplify the interaction between the different components of the proposed 
application in a reliable manner. For example, in our design of the DSEBCPS, the 
measurement models’ developments rely on the information provided by the 
substation model extraction module. Similarly, the dynamic state estimation 
computation components use the measurement models in performing DSE. 
 Facilitate the expansion of the application to accommodate additional functions. 
For example, in our design of the DSEBCPS, every function represents an object 
so that any additional functions can be integrated as additional objects.  
 Enable integration with other applications to perform a system-level application. 
For example, the DSEBCPS at every substation can be using the energy 
management system in the control center to perform dynamic state estimation at 
the system level.  
5.3 Phasor Extraction  
The DSEBCPS performs dynamic state estimation in the quasi-dynamic domain, 
which is the domain that neglects electrical transient phenomena and uses phasor 
quantities. Therefore, phasor quantities need to be computed from the sample values used 
in the settingless relay. These phasor quantities have been computed using Fourier series 
expansion, which allows us to express the sampled waveform x(t) as follows: 
 ( ) cos( ) sin( )1 2
x t a wt a wt harmonics      (5.1) 
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To compute the parameters a1 and a2 efficiently, we propose using the circular array-
based algorithm as illustrated in Figure 5-1 [68]. To explain the algorithm, consider a 
sampled value of x(i) and two sets of circular arrays with N entries each. The entries of the 
circular buffers are initialized to zero. Then the process starts by computing the values y(i) 
and z(i) for each sampled value as follows:  
0
( ) ( )cos( )y i x i W Ti  
0
( ) ( )sin( )z i x i W Ti  
where x(i) is the sampled value at sample i, W0 is the frequency, and T is the period of the 
sampled waveform.  
After each sample, the values of V1(k) and V2(k) are computed as follows:  
1
( ) ( )
1
k N
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For each new sample beyond the first N samples, the values V1(k) and V2(k) are 
updated as follows: 
1 1
( ) ( 1) ( ) ( )V k V k y i y i N      
2 2
( ) ( 1) ( ) ( )V k V k z i z i N      
where ( )y i N  and ( )z i N are the oldest values in the circular buffer that will be 








Finally, the phasor values are computed as follows: 
2( ) ( ( ) ( ))
1 2
x k V k V k
N
   
  
Figure 5-1 Illustration of circular buffer implementation for phasor extraction. 
5.4 Substation Model 
This section demonstrates the process of developing the substation quasi-dynamic 
model in state and control algebraic quadratic companion form (SCAQCF), which relates 
a set of through variables originating from the physical model of the substation to the state 
and control variables of the substation. The SCAQCF is a mathematical model derived 
from the physical model of the power system devices in the substation. Therefore, the 
substation model is a collection of the individual devices’ models within the substation.  
5.4.1 Quadratized Dynamic Model (QDM) 
(5.8) 
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The first step in developing the substation model is to derive the substation physical 
model, which consists of a set of linear and nonlinear algebraic and differential equations. 
These equations are derived from the physical model of the power system devices located 
in the substation. The second step is to quadratize the model to reduce the nonlinearities of 
order to no greater than two. This step is achieved by introducing new state variables. Thus, 
the model consists of only linear and quadratic terms. The model in this format is referred 
to as the quadratized dynamic model (QDM), which has the following standard format: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 11
d t
I t Y t Y t D Ceqx equ eqceqxd dt
   
x
x u
     
 
( )
0 ( ) ( )2 2 22
d t
Y t Y t D Ceqx equ eqceqxd dt
   
x
x u
    
0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3 3 3
( ) ( )3 3
T i T iY t t F t t F teqx eqxx equu
T it F t Cequx eqc
   
            
   
      
 
   
 
  
x x x u u
u x
 






where ( )I t are through variables; ( )x t are the external and internal state variables of the 
substation model; ( )u t  are control variables of the device model;  is a matrix defining 
the coefficients of the state variables for the linear part; 	, 		, and	  are 
matrices defining the coefficients of the state variables for the quadratic part; and D
eqxd
 





The QDM standard format has three sets of equations. The first set is composed of 
external equations that relate the terminal currents to the state variables. The second set is 
internal equations needed to satisfy the physical model of the substation and consists of 
only linear terms. The third set is also composed of internal equations that contain quadratic 
terms. 
5.4.2 State and Control Algebraic Quadratic Companion Form (SCAQCF)  
The third step in developing the substation model is to eliminate the differential terms 
through an integration process. For such a process, we propose a quadratic integration that 
assumes the functions of the integrated waveform vary quadratically within an integration 
time step, as shown in Figure 5-2 [69]. The figure illustrates that the quadratic functions 
are defined by three points: x(t  h), xm, and x(t) within the interval [t – h,t]. The quadratic 
integration has the advantage of improving accuracy and numerical stability and 
minimizing numerical oscillations. The quadratic integration results in a set of SCAQCF 
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where tm is midpoint of the integration step; ,  are through variables, which are 
substation terminal currents that flow into the device at times t and tm; , 	 are 
external and internal state variables of the device model at times t and tm; 	 , 	 
are control variables of the device model at times t and tm; 	 is a matrix defining the 
coefficients of the state variables for the linear part; 	, 		, and	  are matrices 
defining the coefficients of the state variables for the quadratic part; 	 is a constant past 
history–dependent vector; 	 is a matrix defining the coefficients of the state variables 
associated with the last integration step; 	 is a matrix defining the coefficients of the 
through variables associated with the last integration step; and 	 is a constant vector. 
 
Figure 5-2  Quadratic function [69]. 
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5.5 Substation Measurement SCAQCF Model 
The substation model explained in the previous section is used to derive the 
measurements model in the SCAQCF standard. These measurements of the substation have 
four types: 
1. Actual measurements, which are real measurements, such as voltage and current 
measurements, obtained from measurement devices and assigned a percentage error 
equal to the standard deviation of the measurement devices. Usually, these 
measurements, such as the current measurements, are modeled by using the 
corresponding equation in the substation models. Also, some of these 
measurements, such as the voltage measurements, are modeled directly by the state 
variables.  
2. Derived measurements, which are derived from actual measurements, such as the 
neutral current of the transformer. Usually, these measurements are modeled by the 
corresponding equations in the substation models.  
3. Pseudo measurements, which are measurements for quantities that are normally not 
measured, such as the voltage of the neutral. For such quantities, we can assume a 
certain value (i.e., zero for neutral voltages) and assign a relatively large 
measurement error.  
4.  Virtual measurements, which represent the zero value on the left-hand side of the 
equations. These measurements originate from the physical model of the substation. 
Usually, they are assigned a small percentage error.  
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The models for all measurements are stacked with each other to form the SCAQCF 
model of the measurements, which has the following standard format: 
, , , , ,
T i T i T i
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where z is the measurement quantity at times t and tm; 	 is a matrix defining the 
coefficients of the state variables for the linear part; 	, 	, and	  are matrices 
defining the coefficients of the state variables for the quadratic part; 	 is a constant past 
history–dependent vector; 	 is a matrix defining the coefficients of the state variables 
associated with the last integration step; 	 is a matrix defining the coefficients of the 
through variables associated with the last integration step; and 	 is a constant vector. 
5.6 Dynamic State Estimation at Substation Level  
In the proposed scheme, the dynamic state estimation method is used to compute the 
best estimate of the state variables for the substation. These computed states are used to 
calculate the estimated measurement using the substation model. The state estimation 
performance is analyzed through a chi-square test, which measures the goodness of fit 
between the measurements and the substation model. The goodness of fit is quantified by 
what is known as the confidence level. Therefore, a high confidence level indicates that the 
measurements’ fit with the model and the substation is healthy. The following subsection 




5.6.1 Weighted Least-Square Method 
We have used the weighted least-square method to formulate the dynamic state 
estimation at the substation level. This formulation is started by expressing the 
measurements in terms of the state variables of the substation as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) , ,
T iz t h x Y F Cqm x qm x qmk k  
 








where z is the measurements;  is the state variables; Yqm, x is the coefficient matrix of the 
linear terms; Fqm,x is the coefficient matrix of nonlinear terms; Cqm is the constant term; and 
 is the measurement error. 
Then the WLS method is formulated as an optimization problem with an objective 
function to minimize the error as follows [64], [65], [70]:  
      
where	 , 	 ⋯ , ,⋯ , and  is the standard deviation of the meter by 
which the corresponding measurement  is measured.  
For the nonlinear case, the solution is given with Newton’s iterative algorithm as 
follows:  
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For the linear case, the solution is given as follows: 
 1( ) ( )T TX H WH H W Z C  .  
5.6.2  Abnormality Detection 
Abnormality detection is achieved by performing the chi-square test, which 
calculates the goodness of fit between the measurement and the substation model. The 
goodness of fit is quantified by the confidence level. A high confidence level indicates a 
healthy substation, and a low confidence level indicates an abnormality. The chi-square 















 V m n    
 2Pr( ) ( , )P V      
 Confidence level= 2Pr( ) 1 ( , )P V       
where the   variable in equation 5.21 is the summation of normalized residuals, which 
have a Gaussian distribution within the range of –1 to 1. The variable V in equation 5.22 
represents the degree of freedom, which is the difference between the number of the 
measurement (m) and the number of the states (n). The term 2Pr( )  in equation 5.23 is 








the probability that the summation of the normalized residuals is out of the bounds. In fact, 
it is the probability that the measurements do not fit the model. Accordingly, this 
probability is used in equation 5.24 to compute the confidence level which is the probability 
that the measurements fit the substation model.  
 
Figure 5-3 Chi-square probability distribution function [64]. 
5.7 Hypothesis Testing 
This module is initiated when the dynamic state estimation has declared the existence 
of bad data (data abnormality). The objective of this module is to identify the root cause of 
the abnormality which is either power fault or hidden failure. In this context we have three 
possible cases: (1) one or more power faults exist in the substation or any of the 
interconnected circuits, (2) one or more hidden failures exist in the overall system (3) both 
faults and hidden failures exist in the substation. The probability of having two 
simultaneous faults or two simultaneous hidden failures within the substation is very low. 
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However two concurrent events of hidden failure and power fault in the substation are more 
likely to occur. Therefore, our design for this module takes into consideration two scenarios 
(a) single event of either hidden failure or power fault and (b) two concurrent even of both 
hidden failure and power fault.   
To identify the type and location of the abnormality, we propose using hypothesis 
testing. The enabler for such approach is the high redundancy in the measurements at the 
substation level [36], [62]. This redundancy minimizes the possibility of leverage point. 
Therefore, the measurements with abnormality will always experience higher residual error 
than the healthy ones. Accordingly, the hypothesis testing starts by characterizing the 
measurements as suspect based on the values of their normalized residuals. Typically the 
measurements with the highest normalized residual are considered as suspicious 











where inr  is the normalized residual for measurement i,  ˆih x is the calculated 
measurement using the estimated substation states, iz is the measurement i, and i is the 
standard deviation of the meter error. 
To classify the abnormality to either hidden failure or power fault we introduce the 
concept of device common mode criteria which enables grouping multiple suspicious 
measurements into one set if they are modeled by a single device and their normalized 




common mode criterion which allows grouping all the measurements associated with a 
zone, for which settingless relay is operated, into a one set of suspicious measurements if 
their normalized residuals exceed 2 and (2) an instrumentation channel common mode 
criterion which enables grouping the measurements extracted from an instrumentation 
channel if their normalized residual exceed threshold of 2.  
Our design considers three types of hypotheses. The first hypothesis considers bad 
measurements only as a result of hidden failure. This hypothesis involves selecting the 
measurement with the highest normalized residual and subjecting it to instrumentation 
channel common mode criterion to identify the associated instrumentation channel. For 
this particular hypothesis, we also verify the measurements associated with the 
instrumentation channels of the adjacent phases. If they exceed a threshold of 2, they are 
included in the set of the suspicious measurements. The set of suspicious measurements 
and the models of their instrumentation channels are removed from the measurement set 
and substation models respectively. Then the DSEBCPS reruns the DSE. If this process 
reveals high confidence level, hidden failure is detected in the instrumentation channels 
corresponding to the removed models and measurements. The second hypothesis is a power 
fault in the zone for which the settingless relay is operated. This hypothesis involves 
selecting the measurements with highest value of normalized residual and subjecting it to 
zone common mode criterion. If the residuals exceed a threshold of 2, the measurements 
are included in the set of the suspicious measurements. The set of suspicious measurements 
and the models of their zone are removed from the measurements set and substation model 
respectively.  Then the DSEBCPS reruns the DSE. If this process reveals high confidence 
level power fault is detected in the zone corresponded to the removed models and 
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measurements. The third hypothesis is both hidden failure in an instrumentation channel 
and power fault in a zone. The two sets of suspicious measurements considered in the 
previous two hypotheses are grouped as one set of suspicious measurements. Then, this set 
of measurements is removed with their associated models. A successful outcome of the 
third hypothesis indicates a detection of both hidden failure and power fault. 
Figure 5-4 depicts our proposed design for the hypothesis testing. The overall 
concept is to identify a suspicious measurement (i.e., the measurement with the highest 
normalized residual). Then, the suspicious measurement is verified for the device common 
mode criteria to identify the hypothesis under consideration and group suspicious 
measurements according to the selected hypothesis. More specifically, the instrumentation 
channel common mode criterion results in selecting the first type of hypothesis which is 
hidden failure in instrumentation channel. Furthermore, the zone common mode criterion 
results in selecting the second type of hypothesis which is power fault in the corresponding 
zone. In case of single event, the DSEBCPS selects the first or second type of hypothesis 
based on the device common mode criteria, removes suspicious measurements from 
substation measurements and the corresponding device model from substation model and 
reruns the DSE. High confidence level indicates a successful hypothesis and abnormality 
is identified based on the selected hypothesis. In case of two simultaneous events the 
process is summarized in the following points: 
1- The DSEBCPS starts with either hypothesis type1 or type 2 based on the qualified 
device common mode criterion. This hypothesis will fail because of the second 
abnormality.  
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2- The DSEBCPS moves to the second hypothesis during which it verifies the 
normalized residual for all measurements that are not included in the removal 
process during the first hypothesis, picks the highest normalized residual, verifies 
the device common mode criteria, groups the suspicious measurements, removes 
suspicious measurements, and reruns the DSE. This hypothesis will fail because of 
the second abnormality.  
3- It is important to note that if the hypothesis is not successful, the removed set of 
measurements must be returned to the list of the measurements.    
4- The DSE moves to the third hypothesis which combines the previous two types. 
This hypothesis should be successful in restoring high confidence level of the 
substation.  
5-  It is important to note that during the two concurrent events the redundancy in the 
measurements at the substation level will guarantee the convergence of the 
hypothesis testing. In other words, this redundancy will enable the successful 
performance of the hypothesis algorithm. 
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Figure 5-4 Flow chart of the hypothesis testing 
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5.8 Data Correction  
The DSEBCPS uses the substation states to compute the estimated values of 
measurements using the substation models. These calculated measurements are used to 
compute the sampled values corresponding to the compromised measurements with the 
following equation: 
  cosX A w tm m m m      
where Xm is the estimated signal, Am is the estimated magnitude computed in the 
DSEBCPS, and  is the estimated angle computed in the DSEBCPS.  
Upon calculating the sampled values of the compromised measurements, the 
DSEBCPS streams these values to the corresponding position in the circular buffers of the 
process bus at the same rate and in sync with the merging units. Note that this data override 
the compromised data in the circular buffers. Then the settingless relay, which suffers from 
hidden failures, will be automatically using the corrected data and the operation of the 
settingless relay will reset accordingly. To facilitate this process, we propose introducing 
a delay of two cycles in the operation of the settingless relay to allow the DSEBCPS to 
perform the computational procedures and start replacing the compromised data, if 
necessary, in less than two cycles. This means that the DSEBCPS must have the 
computational speed to complete its tasks in about 1.75 cycles or less. The breakdown of 




Figure 5-5 Breakdown of Time-delay for the settingless relay. 
5.9 Summary 
This chapter provides the theoretical details of the dynamic state estimation-based 
centralized protection scheme. The concept requires an accurate substation model, which 
is a collection of the devices’ models within the substation. This model is used to derive 
the measurements’ models, which are used in the dynamic state estimation formulation. 
This formulation entails defining an optimization problem with the objective to minimize 
the error between the actual and calculated measurements. The output of the DSE is the 
best estimate of the substation state variables. The DSE performance is quantified through 
the confidence level calculated through the chi-square test. The confidence level measures 
the consistency between the measurements and their models. Accordingly, if the 
confidence level is high, the substation is healthy; otherwise, there is an abnormality in the 
substation. This abnormality is further classified as a hidden failure or faulty condition 
through hypothesis testing. Finally, upon detecting the hidden failure, the DSEBCPS 
streams the calculated sampled values corresponding to the detected compromised 
measurements to the sample valued circular buffers at the same rate and in sync with the 
merging units to override the compromised measurements. This process ensures that the 
settingless relays will always operate with validated data. To facilitate this process and 
secure the settingless relay from initiating the trip signal, two cycles delay is introduced. 
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CHAPTER 6. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS OF DSEBCPS 
The concept of DSEBCPS is simulated for a relatively small substation which 
comprises five protection zones, as shown in Figures 6-1 and 6-2. The objective of this 
simulation is to demonstrate the concepts explained in Chapters 4 and 5 and show that the 
system can be implemented on a larger scale. The substation is fed by a 115 kV system via 
a 115 kV transmission line. The five protection zones are: (a) the 115 kV transmission line, 
(b) the 115 kV bus, (c) the 115kV/13.8 kV 36 MVA transformer, (d) the 13.8 kV bus, and 
(e) the 13.8 kV distribution line. For simplicity, Figure 6.2 shows only the instrumentation 
channels connected to burdens (i.e., settingless relays). This substation has a total of 202 
measurements (considering real and imaginary quantities for each phase) and 38 states, 
resulting in a redundancy of 513%. Note the redundancy is lower than what will be 
experienced in a typical substation and therefore represents worse conditions from an 
actual substation case. We used this substation to test our concept of DSEBCPS for hidden 
failure detection. We tested the DSEBCPS capabilities for five types of hidden failure: (1) 
PT blown fuse, (2) CT saturation, (3) CT short circuit, (4) CT reverse polarity, and (5) 
Incorrect CT ratio setting.  The simulation for each case includes the effect of the simulated 
hidden failure type in the settingless relays and the response of the DSEBCPS to the event. 
 
Figure 6-1 One line diagram of the substation used in the simulation. 









Figure 6-2 One line diagram with instrumentation channels. 
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6.1 Case 1: Blown Fuse  
 The blown fuse is one of the common hidden failure modes in the PT circuits. It is 
simulated by modeling the fuse as an ideal switch that opens completely when the fuse 
blows. The fuse of the wye-wye connected PT-4, phase A (PT-4A), which provides the 
settingless relays of the transformer zone with the voltage measurement of the secondary 
side of the transformer, was blown.  This case was simulated for three scenarios: (a) single 
event, blown fuse of PT-4A without fault, (b) two non-simultaneous events, blown fuse of 
PT-4A and phase to phase fault in the distribution line, and (c) two simultaneous events, 
blown fuse of PT-4A and phase to phase fault in the distribution line.  The objective of 
these three scenarios is to demonstrate the capability of DSEBCPS to distinguish between 
a hidden failure and a faulty zone through the hypothesis testing. 
6.1.1 Case 1.1: Single Event, Blown Fuse of PT-4A without Fault 
 This scenario examines the effect of a single event of hidden failure on the 
settingless relay and the response of the DSEBCPS.  The simulation period is 5 seconds.  
The event of the blown fuse was initiated at t=2 seconds.  Furthermore, the case was 
initially simulated with a load of 6 MW.  An additional load of 6MW was switched on at 
t=3 seconds and switched off at t=4 seconds. The results of the settingless relay of the 
transformer zone, as well as the proposed DSEBCPS, are presented below. 
Settingless Relay 
The waveform of the voltage measurement extracted from PT4 and recorded in the 
settingless relay of the transformer zone is shown in Figure 6-3.  The figure clearly shows 
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phase A voltage experienced a significant voltage drop as a result of the blown fuse.  The 
figure also depicts the response of the settingless relay that detected abnormal conditions 
and its confidence level dropped.  Moreover, the relay operated accordingly and initiated a 
trip signal, as shown in Figure 6-3.  If this operation is executed, the transformer will be 
tripped because of the blown fuse condition, which is not a fault in the transformer.  This 
case clearly displays the impact of the hidden failures on the operation of the protection 
system and the potential negative consequences in power system operation. 
 
Figure 6-3 Outcome of the settingless relay of the transformer zone for case 6.1.1.  
DSEBCPS  
Figure 6-4 shows the phasor quantities of the events obtained from the DSEBCPS.  
The figure shows the voltage magnitude of phase A experienced a significant drop as a 
result of the blown fuse.  The DSEBCPS responded immediately to the event, which caused 
the confidence level of the substation to drop, by initiating the hypothesis testing, 
summarized in Table 6-1.  During the hypothesis testing the DSEBCPS scanned the values 
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highest normalized residual as a suspicious measurement.  According to Figure 6-5, 
measurement#66 extracted from PT-4A has the highest value of the normalized residuals. 
Furthermore, the device common- mode criteria verification revealed that instrumentation 
channel common mode criterion was satisfied.  Also, verifying the adjacent phases of PT-
4A revealed that they did not qualify as suspicious measurements. Thus, only the 
measurement of PT-4A was considered as suspicious measurement. Accordingly, the 
hypothesis under consideration was a hidden failure in PT4, phase A. Subsequently, all the 
measurements extracted from PT-4A were removed from the measurement set. The 
dynamic state estimation was performed again starting at time: t=2 sec. The results are 
shown in Figure 6-5. Note that this test indicates a high confidence level after the removal 
of the measurements extracted from phase A of PT-4. Moreover, as an outcome of 
hypothesis testing (Figure 6-5), the DSEBCPS detected a hidden failure in the substation. 
In this case, the DSEBCPS issued a diagnostic, inhibited temporarily the operation of the 
setting-less relay. Additionally, Figure 6-5 shows the DSEBCPS did not detect a faulty 
zone because the zone common-mode criterion was not satisfied, which indicated unfaulty 
substation.  Subsequently, the DSEBCPS identified exactly which instrumentation 
channels suffered from hidden failure as shown in Figure 6-6.  The figure shows that the 
DSEBCPS identified PT-4, phase A as the instrumentation channel suffering from hidden 
failure.  This identification corresponds to the removed measurements. Subsequently, the 
DSEBCPS streamed estimated values of PT-4, phase A data to settingless relay to replace 
the compromised data. This case demonstrated that measurement redundancy at the 
substation level makes hypothesis testing quite efficient because the measurement 
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suffering from hidden failure experienced the highest normalized residuals and therefore 
placed first in the removal process.  
Table 6-1 Summary of the hypothesis testing for case 6.1.1 
Hypothesis # Hypothesis under Consideration Result 
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Figure 6-5 The highest values of the normalized residual for case 6.1.1. 
 
Figure 6-6 The outcome of hypothesis testing for case 6.1.1. 
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Settingless Relay Corrected Response  
 The DSEBCPS computes the substation states as an outcome of the DSE.  These 
states are used by the DSEBCPS to compute the estimated measurements for each 
measurement used in performing the DSE including the removed measurements.  Upon 
detecting hidden failure, the DSEBCPS computes the time domain waveforms using the 
calculated measurements, as explained in Chapter 5. The DSEBCPS streams these 
waveforms to the settingless relay, which suffers from the hidden failures, to override the 
compromised measurement. To facilitate this process a delay of 2 cycles in the settingless 
relay operation is introduced.  This process is depicted in Figure 6-8 where the bad signal 
was overridden in the relay with the calculated sampled values after 2 cycles of the blown 
fuse initiation. Furthermore, the confidence level of the settingless relay responded to the 
bad data replacement and recovered from low confidence level as shown in Figure 6-8, 
which also shows that the trip signal was not initiated because of the 2-cycle delay 
introduced in the operation of the settingless relay.  This process demonstrates the 
advantage of this scheme in maintaining high security and dependability of the protection 
system even with the presence of hidden failures. For this example high security was 
demonstrated in detecting the hidden failure, while high dependability was demonstrated 




Figure 6-8 Settingless relay corrected response for case 6.1.1 
6.1.2 Case 1.2: Two Non-Concurrent Events, Blown Fuse of PT-4A and Phase to Phase 
Fault in the Distribution Line 
 The definition of hidden failures states that the hidden failures initiation takes place 
during the switching event in the network such as load switching and fault initiation.  
Moreover, the definition implies that the switching event might be concurrent or ahead of 
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time in a short time window of the hidden failure.  The latter is simulated in this case with 
one cycle time window.  The first event is a phase to phase fault at the middle of the 
distribution line, initiated at t=2 seconds.  One cycle later, at t=2.016s seconds, the second 
event of blown fuse (i.e., hidden failure) was initiated by modeling the fuse as an ideal 
switch that opens completely when the fuse blows.  Similar to the previous case, the fuse 
located in the primary side of the wye-wye connected PT 4, phase A, was blown.  The 
simulation period is 5 seconds.  Furthermore, the case was simulated initially with a load 
of 6 MW.  An additional load of 6MW was switched on at t=3 seconds and switched off at 
t=4 seconds.  The objective of this case is to test the performance of the DSEBCPS for two 
events in the substation.  The results of settingless relay of the transformer zone, as well as 
the proposed DSEBCPS, are presented below. 
Settingless Relay 
Figures 6-9 and 6-10 show the waveforms of the event recorded in the settingless 
relay of the distribution line zone.  Both figures show the line experienced a phase to phase 
fault between phases A and B.  Figures 6-11 depicts the responses of the settingless relay 
of the distribution line zone, which detected abnormal condition and caused the confidence 
level of the relay to drop.  Consequently, the relay operated and initiated trip signals, as 
shown in Figures 6-11.  Moreover, Figures 6-12 shows the voltage waveforms of the 
secondary side of the transformer zone recorded from PT4.  It clearly shows that phase A 
experienced a significant voltage drop as a result of the blown fuse.  Additionally, the 
settingless relay of the transformer zone operated as demonstrated in the previous case.  If 
these operations are executed, the transformer and the distribution line will be tripped 
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because of the blown fuse and phase to phase fault, respectively.  The results of the former 
case, show settingless relay misoperation, if no correction action was inserted.  On the other 
hand, the operation of the settingless relay of the distribution line zone was correct because 
of the faulty condition.  This case demonstrates that hidden failures can widen the power 
system interruptions by including healthy zones. 
 
Figure 6-9 Voltage and current waveforms of distribution line zone side 1 for case 
6.1.2. 
.  
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Figure 6-11 settingless relay response of the distribution line zone for case 6.1.2.  
 
Figure 6-12 Settingless relay output of the transformer zone for case 6.1.2.  
DSEBCPS 
Figures 6-13 and 6-14 show the phasor quantities of the events recorded from the 
DSEBCPS associated with side 1 of the distribution line.  The figures show the line 
experienced phase to phase fault between phases A and B.  Moreover, Figure 6-15 shows 
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shows the voltage magnitude of phase A experienced significant voltage drop because of 
the blown fuse.  Consequently, the DSEBCPS responded to the first event at t=2s (i.e., the 
fault in the distribution line), which caused the confidence level of the substation to drop 
by initiating the hypothesis testing summarized in Table 6-2 and 6-3.  During the test, the 
DSEBCPS scanned the values of the normalized residuals of all the measurements and 
extracted the highest value.  According to Figure 6-16 measurement #116, extracted from 
CT14, phase A and modeled by the distributing line model had the highest normalized 
residual.  The device common mode criteria verification revealed that the zone common 
mode criterion associated with the distribution line was satisfied because all the 
measurements modeled by zone 5 experienced higher value of normalized residual that 
exceeded the threshold of 2.  Thus all the measurements of the distribution line were 
considered as a set of suspicious measurements. Accordingly, the hypothesis under 
consideration was power fault in the distribution line. Subsequently, the DSEBCPS 
removed these measurements from the measurement set and rerun the dynamic state 
estimation starting at time: t=2 sec. This process revealed high confidence level, which 
indicates a successful hypothesis. 
One cycle later at t=2.016s, the confidence level of the substation dropped and 
initiated the hypothesis testing again.  Figure 6-17 shows the highest set of the 
measurement normalized residuals computed by the DSEBCPS during the second event.  
The figure shows that the measurement#66 extracted from PT-4, phase A had the highest 
normalized residual.  Verifying the device common mode criteria revealed that the 
instrumentation channel common mode criterion associated with only PT4, phase A was 
satisfied.  Therefore, the hypothesis under consideration at t=2.016 was hidden failure in 
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PT4, phase A. Subsequently, the DSEBCPS removed all measurements extracted from PT, 
4 phase A from the measurements set and rerun the DSE.   
Figure 6-18 shows the outcome of the two hypotheses at t=2s and t= 2.016s. The 
figure shows both hypotheses were successful as indicated by high confidence level for the 
substation.  DSEBCPS detected a faulty zone and hidden failure in the substation, as shown 
in Figure 6-18.  Additionally, the figure shows that the phase to phase fault led the blown 
fuse event by one cycle, approximately.  Moreover, the DSEBCPS specified which part of 
the substation suffered from the fault and hidden failures, as shown in Figures 6-19 and 6-
20, respectively.  Accordingly, DSEBCPS issued a diagnostic, inhibited temporarily the 
operation of the settingless relay of the transformer zone and permitted the operation of the 
settingless relay of the distribution line zone.  This simulation shows the redundancy in the 
measurements makes the hypothetical testing very efficient because the measurement 
suffering from hidden failures was placed first in the removal process. 
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Figure 6-14 Current magnitude and phase angle of the distribution line side 1 for case 
6.1.2 
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Table 6-2 Summary of the hypothesis testing at t=2s for case 6.1.2. 
Hypothesis # Hypothesis under Consideration Result 
1 Power fault in the distribution line High confidence level 
Table 6-3 Summary of the hypothesis testing at t=2.016s for case 6.1.2. 
Hypothesis # Hypothesis under Consideration Result 
1 Hidden Failure in PT-4A High confidence level 
 
 
Figure 6-16 The highest values of normalized residuals during the phase to phase fault 





Figure 6-17 The highest values of normalized residuals during the blown fuse event 
for case 6.1.2. 
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Figure 6-19 Faulty zone identification for case 6.1.2.  
 
Figure 6-20 Hidden failure status in instrumentation channel for case 6.1.2 
Settingless Relay Corrected Response 
The DSEBCPS computed the sampled values of the compromised measurement as 
explained in Chapter 5. Then, it streamed these sampled values to the affected settingless 
relay. These waveforms overrode the compromised measurements in the affected 
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was corrected in the settingless relay of the transformer zone after 2 cycles of the blown 
fuse initiation.  Furthermore, the confidence level of the settingless relay responded to the 
bad data replacement and recovered from a low confidence level as shown in Figure 6-21, 
which also shows the trip signal was not initiated because of the 2-cycle delay introduced 
in the operation of the settingless relay. 
 
Figure 6-21 Corrected response of settingless relay of transformer zone for case 6.1.2.  
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6.1.3  Case-3: Two Concurrent Events, Blown Fuse of PT-4A and Phase to Phase Fault 
in the Distribution Line 
The two events of the previous cases were simulated concurrently of each other.  
The simulation period was 5 seconds.  The sequence of events included the initiation of the 
blown fuse of PT-4A and the phase to phase fault at the middle of the distribution line at 
t=2 seconds; the fault was cleared at t=2.5 seconds.  Furthermore, a 6 MW load was 
included during the simulation.  Additionally, 6 MW was switched on and switched off at 
t=3 seconds and t=4 seconds, respectively.  The objective of this case is to test the 
performance of the DSEBCPS for two simultaneous events in the substation.  The results 
of the settingless relays of the transformer zone and distribution line as well as of the 
proposed DSEBCPS are presented below. 
Settingless Relay 
As with the previous two cases, the settingless relays of the transformer zone and 
the distribution line zone detected abnormal conditions, which caused the confidence levels 
of both relays to drop.  Consequently, both relays initiated trip signals. 
DSEBCPS 
The DSEBCPS responded to both events by initiating the hypothesis testing at t=2s 
summarized in Table 6.4.  The DSEBCPS considered three hypotheses for this case. The 
first hypothesis was power fault in the distribution line because the highest normalized 
residual was experienced by measuremnt#116 as shown in Figure 6-22. This measurements 
extracted from CT 14, phase A and modeled by zone-5. Also, measurement#116 satisfied 
 86
the zone common mode criterion of zone-5. Accordingly the DSEBCPS removed zone-5 
measurements from the measurements set and the zone model from the substation model 
and rerun the DSE.  The outcome of this hypothesis was low confidence level which means 
unsuccessful hypothesis. The second hypothesis was a hidden failure in PT4, phase A. This 
hypothesis was considered because the second highest normalized residual in the 
measurements, which were not part of the first set of suspicious measurement considered 
during the first hypothesis, was experienced in measurement#66 as shown in Figure 6-22. 
This measurement was extracted from PT-4A.  Also, this measurement satisfied the 
instrumentation common mode criterion of PT-4A.  Subsequently the DSE removed all the 
measurements associated with PT4, phase A and rerun the DSE.  The outcome of this 
hypothesis was low confidence level, which means unsuccessful hypothesis. The third 
hypothesis combined the previous two hypotheses. It considered both power fault in the 
distribution line and hidden failures in PT4, phase A. Subsequently, both set of suspicious 
measurements associated with distribution line and PT4, phase A were removed from the 
measurements set and rerun the DSE. This hypothesis was successful as shown in Figure 
6-23, which shows successful hypothesis testing, indicated by a high confidence level after 
the elimination of both set of suspicious measurements.  Moreover, as an outcome of the 
two-level hypothesis testing, the DSEBCPS detected a faulty zone and hidden failure in 
the substation, as shown in Figure 6-23.The DSEBCPS specified which part of the 
substation suffered from the hidden failure and the fault as shown in Figures 6-24 and 6-
25, respectively.  Accordingly, DSEBCPS issued a diagnostic, inhibited temporarily the 
operation of the setting-less relay of the transformer zone and permitted the operation of 
the settingless relay of the distribution line zone.  This simulation showed that the 
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redundancy in the measurements makes the hypothetical testing very efficient because the 
measurements suffering from abnormalities are placed first in the elimination process 
through the device common-mode criteria.  This case demonstrated the capability of the 
DSEBCPS in detecting two concurrent events; hidden failures and power fault, which 
represents the most challenging scenario.  
 
Table 6-4 Summary of the hypothesis testing at t=2.0s for case 6.1.3. 
Hypothesis # Hypothesis under consideration  Result 
1 Power fault in distribution line Low confidence level 
2 Hidden failure in PT-4A Low confidence level 
3 Power fault in distribution line & 
Hidden failure in PT-4A 
High confidence level 
 
 
Figure 6-22 T he highest values of normalized residuals for case 6.1.3. 
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Figure 6-23 The outcome of DSEBCPS for case 6.1.3. 
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Figure 6-25 Faulty zone identification from DSEBCPS for case 6.1.3 
Settingless Relay Corrected Response 
As in the previous case, the estimated measurements and their time stamps are streamed 
to the settingless relay.  This process is similar to the case depicted in Figure 6-21 of case 
6.1.2. 
6.2 Case2: CT Short Circuit 
CT short circuit takes place when the CT terminals are shorted which results in a 
significant drop in the current measurement associated with the shorted CT. It is one of the 
critical hidden failure modes in the CT circuit that causes protection system misoperation. 
This case examines the responses of the setting-less relay and the DSEBCPS to this type 
of hidden failure in the CT circuit. Therefore, CT9, phase A, (CT-9A), which provides the 
setting-less relay of the transformer zone with current measurement for the secondary side 
of the transformer, was shorted. This type of hidden failure is modeled by shorting the CT 
terminals during the initiation of the event. Two cases were considered; (1) Single event of 
hidden failure; CT-9A short circuit and (2) Two simultaneous events of hidden failure; CT-
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6.2.1 Case 2.1: Single Event, CT-9A Short Circuit 
This case examines the responses of the setting-less relay and the DSEBCPS to a 
single event of hidden failure.  The sequence of events started at t=2s during which 6 MW 
load was switched on and CT 9, phase A was shorted. The simulation started initially with 
6 MW load and lasted for 5s. The results of the setting-less relay, as well as the proposed 
DSEBCPS, for the simulated event are presented below.  
Settingless Relay  
 Figure 6-26 shows the current waveforms recorded from CT-9A experienced a 
significant drop because of the CT short circuit.  Moreover, the figure shows the setting-
less relay responded to the event indicated by the drop in the confidence level.  
Accordingly, the relay initiated a trip signal to isolate the transformer. This response is a 
relay misoperation because no power fault exists in the system, which demonstrates the 
effect of the hidden failures.  
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DSEBCPS 
The DSEBCPS responded to the event by initiating the hypothesis testing, which is 
summarized in Table 6-5. During hypothesis testing the DSEBCPS scanned the values of 
the normalized residuals of all the measurements and extracted the highest value. 
According to Figure 6-27, measurement#72 extracted from CT-9A has the highest 
normalized residual. Subsequently, the DSEBCPS verified the common mode criteria, 
which revealed the instrumentation channel common mode criterion associated with CT-
9A was satisfied. Accordingly, the hypothesis under consideration was a hidden failure in 
CT-9A. Therefore, all the measurements extracted from CT-9A were removed from the 
measurements set and the DSEBCPS re-performed the dynamic state estimation. The 
output of the new DSE is shown in Figure 6-28 which depicts high confidence level 
following the removal process that took place at t=2s. Furthermore, Figure 6-28 shows the 
DSEBCPS detected hidden failure because of the satisfaction of the instrumentation 
channel common mode criterion. Additionally, the DSEBCPS specified exactly the 
location of the hidden failure that corresponded to the removed measurements as shown in 
Figure 6-29. Accordingly, DSEBCPS issued a diagnostic, inhibited temporarily the 
operation of the setting-less relay of the transformer zone.  It is important to note that the 
hypothesis testing and the re-performance of the DSE took place only for one time sample 
that corresponds to the initiation of the abnormality.  
Table 6-5 Summary of the hypothesis testing at t=2s for case 6.2.1. 
Hypothesis # Hypothesis Under Consideration Result 
1 Hidden Failure in CT-9A High confidence level 
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Figure 6-27 Highest values of normalized residual for case 6.2.1 
 
Figure 6-28 The DSEBCPS results for case 6.2.1. 
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Corrected Settingless Response  
Figure 6-30 shows the corrected response of the setting-less relay.  This figure shows that 
the detected bad signal from CT-9 was overridden by the calculated measurements 
computed in the DSEBCPS.  These calculated sampled values corresponding to the bad 
signal were streamed from the DSEBCPS to the setting-less relay with their time stamps 
to override the compromised measurement.  Furthermore, the confidence level of the 
setting-less relay responded to the replacement of the bad data and recovered to a high 
level, as shown in Figure 6-30, which also shows that the trip signal was not initiated 
because of the two-cycle delay introduced in the operation of the setting-less relay.  
 
Figure 6-30 Settingless relay corrected response for case 6.2.1 
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6.2.2 Case 2.2: Concurrent Events, CT-9A Short Circuit and Power Fault 
This scenario tests the response of the DSEBCPS for two concurrent events, CT 
short circuit in CT9, phase A and phase to phase fault in the 13.8 kV feeder.  Both events 
were initiated simultaneously at t=2s.  Moreover, the fault was cleared at 2.5s. The 
simulation was started with load of 12 MW and lasted for 5s. The response of both 
settingless relays and DSEBCPS are presented below 
Settingless Relay 
Figure 6-31 shows the settingless relay of the transformer zone.  Moreover, the figure 
shows that the relay responded to the event of CT short circuit as indicated by the drop in 
the confidence level. Subsequently, the relay initiated a trip signal to isolate the transformer 
zone. Furthermore, the response of the setting-less relay for the distribution line is depicted 
in Figure 6-32, which shows that the relay responded to the phase to phase fault and 
initiated a trip signal. Therefore, this scenario resulted in the tripping of two zones (i.e., the 
transformer and the distribution line). If the relays’ operations are executed, the transformer 
and the distribution line will be tripped because of the CT short circuit and phase to phase 
fault, respectively. The former case results in isolating the transformer because of the CT 
short circuit, which is not a faulty condition.  
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Figure 6-31 Settingless relay output of transformer zone for case 6.2.2 
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DSEBCPS 
        The phasor quantities of the current waveform recorded from CT-9 are shown in 
Figure 6-33.  The figure clearly shows that the current magnitude of phase A experienced 
a significant drop because of the CT short circuit condition.  The DSEBCPS responded to 
the event by initiating the hypothesis testing summarized in Table 6-6.  The table shows 
three hypotheses were considered because of the two simultaneous events.  The first two 
hypotheses considered only one device (i.e., full zone or instrumentation channel) during 
the removal process, which all failed to achieve high confidence level.  On the other hand, 
the third hypothesis was successful.  This hypothesis was power fault in the distribution 
line and hidden failure in CT-9A.  The process started by selecting the measurement with 
the highest normalized residual and verifying the device common mode criteria.  According 
to Figure 6-34 measurement#92 extracted from CT-12A and modeled by the zone-5 had 
the highest normalized residual. This measurement satisfied the device common mode 
criterion associated with zone 5 and therefore, all the measurements modeled by zone 5 
were selected as first set of the suspicious measurements. Then, the measurement with the 
second highest normalized residual value, which was not part of the first set of suspicious 
measurements, was selected as second suspicious measurement and subjected to common 
mode criteria. According to Figure 6-34, this measurement was measurement #72 which 
satisfied the instrumentation channels common mode criterion associated with CT9, phase 
A. Therefore, the third hypothesis under consideration was a fault in the distribution feeder 
and a hidden failure in CT9, phase A which both were considered in the previous two 
hypotheses. Hence, the DSEBCPS removed all the measurements and the models 
associated with these devices. This removal process results in high confidence level, which 
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indicates a successful hypothesis. Figure 6-35 depicts the result of the DSEBCPS, which 
shows both fault and hidden failure were detected as a result of the two level hypothesis 
testing. Additionally, the DSEBCPS located the portions of the system that suffer from the 
abnormalities as shown in Figures 6-36 and 6-37.   
 
Figure 6-33 Current Phasor quantities from CT 9 of transformer Zone for case 6.2.2. 
Table 6-6 Summary of the hypothesis testing at t=2.0s for case 6.2.2. 
Hypothesis # Hypothesis Result 
1 Power fault in distribution line Low confidence level 
2 Hidden failure in CT-9A Low confidence level 
3 Power fault in distribution line & 
Hidden failure in C9-9A 
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Figure 6-34 The highest values of the normalized residual for case 6.2.2. 
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Figure 6-36 Faulty zone status for case 6.2.2 
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Settingless Relay Corrected Response 
Figure 6-38 shows the corrected response of the setting-less relay. This figure shows that 
the detected bad signal from CT-9 has been replaced by the calculated measurement 
computed in the DSEBCPS as explained in Chapter 5. The calculated sampled values are 
streamed from the DSBCPS to the settingless relay with their time stamps to override the 
compromised measurements in the settingless relay. Furthermore, the confidence level of 
the setting-less relay responded to the replacement of the bad data and recovered to a high 
level, as shown in Figure 6-38, which also shows that the trip signal was not initiated 
because of the two-cycle delay introduced in the operation of the setting-less relay.  
 
Figure 6-38 Corrected response of settingless relay of transformer zone for case 6.2.2. 
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6.3 Case 3: CT Saturation 
CT saturation is one of the common hidden failure modes that might cause relay 
misoperation.  This mode of hidden failure is modeled and simulated to test the response 
of the settingless relay and the DSEBCPS. specifically, CT-3, phases A and B, which 
provide the settingless relay of the transmission line zone with the current measurement, 
were modeled to saturate during phase to phase fault in the primary side of the transformer.  
The model entailed increasing the CT burden to a higher level that drives the CT to saturate 
during fault condition.  Moreover, we increased the short circuit level of the source to drive 
a higher short-circuit current.  The sequence of events started by initiating phase to phase 
fault inside the transformer at t=1.5 seconds; the fault was cleared at around t=2 seconds.  
The case was simulated during a no-load condition.  The performance of the settingless 
relay for the transformer zone, as well as the proposed DSEBCPS, is presented below. 
Settingless Relay 
 Figure 6-39 shows the current waveforms of the primary side of the transformer 
depicted from the settingless relay of the transformer zone.  It shows that the transformer 
zone experienced phase to phase fault between phase A and phase B.  Moreover, Figure 6-
39 depicts the relay operations for this event, which shows that the confidence level of the 
relay dropped and the trip signal was initiated.  This operation is correct, given the fault 
within the transformer zone.  Figures 6-40 and 6-41 show the output of the settingless 
relays of the transmission line zone.  Both figures show that the current waveforms of CT3, 
phase A and phase B are distorted because of the CT saturation.  The response of the 
settingless relay depends on whether the CT model was included in the overall zone model.  
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In the event the CT model is not included, the relay will operate and initiate a trip signal as 
shown in Figure 6-40, because the saturated wave violates the overall transmission line 
model.  This action is considered as a relay misoperation because of hidden failure.  
However, if the CT model is included with the zone models, the relay will not operate as 
shown in Figure 6-41; this is because the CT model captures the saturation condition.   
 
Figure 6-39 The outcome of the settingless relay of the transformcer zone for case 6.3. 
Figure 6-40 The outcome of the settingless relay of the transmission line without the 
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Figure 6-41 The outcome of the settingless relay of the transmission line with CT 
model for case 6.3. 
DSEBCPS 
Figure 6-42 depicts the phasor quantities of the current measurement of the primary 
side of the transformer, clearly showing that the transformer experienced phase to phase 
fault in the primary side of the transformer.  Moreover, Figure 6-42 shows the phasor 
quantities of the current measurement extracted from CT-3.  There is a notable reduction 
in the current magnitude of phase A and phase B because of the CT saturation. 
The DSEBCPS responded to both events by initiating the hypothesis testing 
summarized in Table-7. There were three hypotheses under consideration. The first two 
considered a single event of either hidden failure or power fault, which both failed to restore 
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high confidence level of the substation. The third hypothesis combined the previous two 
hypotheses by considering both power fault in the transformer and hidden failure in CT 3A 
and B.  The selection of these two hypotheses was based on the values of the normalized 
residuals. As shown in Figure 6-44, measurement#42 experienced the highest normalized 
residual. This measurement satisfied the transformer common mode criterion and 
therefore, all transformer measurements were grouped as a set of suspicious measurements.  
Furthermore, measurement #25 experienced the second highest normalized residual of the 
measurements that was not included in the first set of suspicious measurements.  These 
measurements satisfied the instrumentation channel common mode criterion of CT3 phases 
A and B.  Accordingly all measurements extracted from CT3A and CT3B were grouped as 
a second set of suspicious measurements.  Subsequently, The DSEBCPS removed both set 
of suspicious measurements from the measurements set and rerun the DSE.  This 
hypothesis was successful as indicated by the high confidence level of the substation as 
shown in Figure 6-45.  Moreover, as an outcome of the two-level hypothesis testing, the 
DSEBCPS detected a faulty zone and hidden failure in the substation as shown in Figure 
6-45.  Furthermore, the DSEBCPS specified which part of the substation suffered from 
hidden failures and the fault as shown in Figures 6-46 and 6-47, respectively.  This 
simulation also shows that the redundancy in the measurements makes two-level 
hypothesis testing very efficient because the measurements that display abnormalities 





Table 6-7 Summary of the hypothesis testing at t=1.5s for case 6.3. 
Hypothesis # Hypothesis under consideration Result 
1 Power fault in Transformer Low confidence level 
2 Hidden failure in CT-3A and 3B Low confidence level 
3 Power fault in Transformer & 
Hidden failure in C3-A and 3B 
High confidence level 
 
 
Figure 6-42 Current phasor quantities of the primary side of the transformer for case 
6.3. 
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Figure 6-44 The highest values of the normalized residual for case 6.3 
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Figure 6-46 Hidden failure detection for case 6.3. 
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Settingless Relay Corrected Response 
 Similar to the previous cases, the DSEBCPS streamed the calculated sampled 
values corresponding to the detected bad signals to the settingless relay of the transmission 
line zone to override the bad signals.  This process is depicted in Figure 6-48.  
 




6.4 Case4: CT Reverse Polarity 
CT reverse polarity is one type of hidden failures in the CT circuit.  Typically, this 
event occurs following pre-commissioning activities for a new substation or maintenance 
activities for an existing substation. In either case, the problem remains hidden following 
the energization until the affected zone is loaded. This case simulates the CT reverse 
polarity to analyze the response of both the setting-less relay and the DSEBCPS. 
Specifically, we modeled CT-10 phases A, B, and C, which provide the setting-less relay 
of the transformer zone with the current measurements, with reverse polarity by swapping 
the terminals of each CT at the relay terminals. The sequence of events starts with 
energizing the substation at t=0 s with no load. Then, the transformer is loaded with 15 
MW at t=3 s. The response of the settingless relay and the DSEBCPS is presented below.  
Settingless Relay 
Figure 6-49 shows the current waveforms of the secondary side of the transformer depicted 
from the setting-less relay of the transformer zone. The figure shows 180 degree-phase 
shift between the current waveforms extracted from CT 9 (i.e., the healthy CT) and CT 10 
because of the reverse polarity. Figure 6-49 also depicts the setting-less relay operation for 
this event, which shows that the relay operated and initiated a trip signal to isolate the 
transformer. This response is a relay misoperation because of the hidden failure. This case 
demonstrated the negative consequences of the hidden failure in power system operation, 
which requires a proper action.   
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Figure 6-49 The outcome of the settingless relay of the transformer zone for case 6.4. 
DSEBCPS 
Figure 6-50 shows the angles of the current waveforms extracted from CT-10 compared to 
the angles of current waveforms extracted from CT-9. The DSEBCPS responded to the 
event of the hidden failure by initiating hypothesis testing summarized in Table 6-8. During 
such testing the DSEBCPS verified the values of the normalized residuals of the 
measurements and extracted the highest value. According to Figure 6-51, measurement 
#78, extracted from CT-10 phase A experienced the highest normalized residual. This 
measurement was subjected to device common mode criteria verification, which revealed 
the instrumentation channel common mode criterion associated with CT-10, phases A, B, 
and C was satisfied.  Accordingly the hypothesis under consideration was hidden failures 
in CT-10 phases A, B and C.  Subsequently all measurement extracted from these 
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instrumentation channels were grouped as suspicious measurements and removed from the 
measurements set. The DSEBCPS rerun the DSE which revealed high confidence level as 
shown in Figure 6-52.  This indicates a successful hypothesis.  Accordingly, the DSEBCPS 
detected hidden failures within the substation and did not detect any faulty zones.  
Additionally, the DSEBCPS precisely identified the instrumentation channels that suffer 
from the hidden failures, as shown in Figure 6-53. This case demonstrates the advantage 
of redundancy in the measurements, which makes the hypothesis testing very efficient by 
placing the detected faulty measurements first during the removal process. 
 
Figure 6-50 Angles of the current waveform extratced from CT9 and CT 10 for case 
6.4 
Table 6-8 Summary of the hypothesis testing at t=3s for case 6.4. 
Hypothesis # Hypothesis under consideration Result 




CT-9A Primary Current Angle  
12.11 
-76.09 
CT-10A Primary Current Angle  
69.96 
-0.625 
CT-9B Primary Current Angle  
179.7 
-112.6 
CT-10B Primary Current Angle  
-51.98 
-134.1 
CT-9C Primary Current Angle  
128.0 
45.94 
CT-10C Primary Current Angle  
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Figure 6-51 The highest values of the normalized residual for case 6.4 
 
Figure 6-52 The outcome of DSEBCPS for case 6.4. 
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Corrected Response of Settingless Relay  
Similar to the previous cases, the detected bad waveform in the settingless relay 
were overridden by calculated sampled values computed in the DSEBCPS and streamed to 
the settingless relay as shown in Figure 6-54. This process results in confidence level 
recovery which eliminates the initiation of the trip signal.   
 
Figure 6-54 Corrected response of settingless relay of transformer zone for case 6.4. 
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6.5 Case5: CT Incorrect Ratio Settings 
 Another common hidden failure that could affect protection system operation is the 
incorrect CT ratio setting.  It is usually a protection engineer’s responsibility to provide the 
relay setting, which includes the CT ratio.  Therefore, if the engineer sets the ratio 
incorrectly or the technician implements it in the relay inaccurately, the relay will have the 
incorrect setting.  Subsequently, the settingless relay will read the incorrect primary current 
values and might misoperate.  Generally, this event occurs following pre-commissioning 
activities for a new substation or maintenance activities for an existing substation.  In both 
cases, the problem remains hidden following the energization until the affected zone starts 
to be loaded.  This case examines the effect of the wrong CT ratio setting in the settingless 
relays and DSEBCPS.  More specifically, the ratio associated with CT-10, phases A, B, 
and C, which provide the settingless relay of the transformer zone with the current 
measurements, is set to 1000/5 instead of 4000/5 (i.e., the correct ratio).  The sequence of 
events starts by energizing the substation at t=0 seconds with no load.  Then, the 
transformer is loaded with 15 MW at t=3 seconds.  The results of the settingless relays of 
the transformer zone, as well as the proposed DSEBCPS, are presented below. 
Settingless Relay 
 Figure 6-55 shows the current waveforms of the secondary side of the transformer 
seen in the settingless relay of the transformer zone.  It shows a drop in the current 
measurement of CT-10 compared to CT-9 because of the wrong CT ratio.  Figure 6-55 also 
depicts the settingless relay operation for this event, which shows that the relay operated 
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and initiated a trip signal to isolate the transformer.  This response is a relay misoperation 
because there was no faulty condition in the transformer. 
 
Figure 6-55 The outcome of the settingless relay of the transformer zone for case 6.5. 
DSEBCPS 
Figure 6-56 shows the magnitude of the phasor currents extracted from CT-9 and 
CT-10.  The figure clearly shows the reduction in the current magnitude seen by the 
DSEBCPS because of the wrong CT ratio.  This event caused the confidence level of the 
substation to drop.  Therefore, DSEBCPS initiated hypothesis testing (Table 6-9), during 
which the DSEBCPS verified the values of the normalized residuals of all the 
measurements and extracted the highest value.  According to Figure 6-57, the measurement 
#81 extracted from CT-10, phase B has the highest normalized residual.  Hence, the 
DSEBCPS selected this measurement as suspicious measurement and subjected it to device 
common-mode criterion.  For this case, the instrumentation channel common mode 
criterion associated with CT-10, phases A, B and C was satisfied. Therefore, the hypothesis 
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under consideration was hidden failure in CT-10, phases A, B and C.   Subsequently, the 
DSEBCPS removed all the measurements extracted from CT10 and rerun the DSE. Figure 
6-58 shows that this hypothesis was successful and resulted in a high confidence level.  
Moreover, The DSEBCPS managed to detect hidden failures within the substation and did 
not detect a faulty zone.  Additionally, the DSEBCPS identified the instrumentation 
channels that suffer from the hidden failures, which is CT-10 as shown in Figure 6-59.  As 
in the previous cases, we see the advantage of the redundancy at the substation level in 
making the hypothesis testing very efficient. 
 
Figure 6-56 Magnitudes of the current phasor quantities of CT9 and CT 10 for case 
6.5. 
Table 6-9 Summary of the hypothesis testing at t=3 s for case 6.5 
Hypothesis # Hypothesis under consideration Result 




CT-9A Primary Current Mag
CT-10A Primary Current Mag
575.3 
0.159 
CT-9B Primary Current Mag
CT-10B Primary Current Mag
564.9 
0.198 
CT-9C Primary Current Mag
CT-10C Primary Current Mag
0.000 s 4.992 s
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Figure 6-57 The highest values of the normalized residual for case 6.5. 
 
Figure 6-58 The outcome of DSEBCPS for case 6.5. 
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Corrected Response of Settingless Relay 
 Similar to the previous cases, the response of the settingless relay is corrected by 
replacing the detected bad measurements, as shown in Figure 6-60.  The DSEBCPS 
streamed the calculated sampled values corresponding to the bad signal to override the bad 
measurements in the settingless relay of the transformer zone. Accordingly the confidence 
level recovered and the relay did not initiate the trip signal. 
 
Figure 6-60 Corrected response of settingless relay of transformer zone for case 6.5. 
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6.6  Summary 
This chapter demonstrated the capability of the DSEBCPS to detect hidden failures 
in real time.  Moreover, it shows the capability of the DSEBCPS to secure the settingless 
relay operation during hidden failures while maintaining high degree of dependability.  
Five cases of hidden failures were simulated: (1) PT blown fuse, (2) CT saturation, (3) CT 
short circuit, (4) CT reverse polarity, and (5) Wrong CT ratio setting.  The DSEBCPS 
managed to detect the hidden failure for each case and identified the instrumentation 
channels that suffer from the hidden failures. Additionally, the simulation cases 
demonstrated the DSEBCPS capacity to distinguish between hidden failures and power 
faults through the hypothesis testing.  Furthermore, the cases show the advantage of high 
redundancy in the measurements at the substation level, which makes hypothesis testing 
quite efficient because the suspicious measurements always experience the highest 
normalized residual. This characteristic eliminates the possibility of leverage points and 










CHAPTER 7. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
7.1 Introduction 
Critical to this work is the ability to manage data and communications between the 
various devices (i.e., merging units, settingless relays and DSEBCPS) within the substation 
and also between the substation and the control center. We define the details of the system 
architecture, which specifies data management, communication protocols, and the 
hierarchical structure of the system. Figure 4-2 in Chapter 4 depicts conceptually the top 
view of the architecture, which shows that the system consists of the following three layers 
of communication: (1) the communication between merging units (MUs) and settingless 
relays through the process bus, (2) the communication between settingless relays and 
DSEBCPS through the station bus, and (3) the communication between DSEBCPS and the 
control center through the station bus. This chapter explains the details of our proposed 
design for each layer and how the layers interact with one another to form the overall 
system architecture. Our design for this architecture complies with IEC-61850 standard 
requirements. We achieve this compatibility by using the data objects, services, and 
communication protocols defined in the standard. The implementation of IEC 61850 
permits interoperability between products from different vendors, which enables seamless 
migration to our proposed scheme within existing substations [1]. Furthermore, this chapter 
sheds light on this approach’s long-term goals: to support the next generation of energy 
management systems (EMS), where the proposed system will provide the necessary data 
and real-time models to the control center for performing the usual control center functions, 
including state estimation, optimization, and control. 
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7.2 IEC 61850 Overview 
 The main objective of IEC 61850 is to standardize data communication within the 
substation [7], [71]. The overall concept of IEC 61850 uses abstract modeling and 
virtualization approaches [7], [71], [72]. Abstract modeling entails creating abstract 
definitions of data items/objects and services that are independent of the communication 
protocol [7], [73], [74]. Data modeling, which is performed using an object-oriented 
approach, consists of logical nodes (LNs) that represent functions or equipment that 
exchange data [7], [75]. Abstract services are services that act on the data to read, write, 
issue control commands, receive alarms, and manage audit logs [76], [77]. IEC 61850-7-1 
explains virtualization as a tool “that provides a view of those aspects of a real device that 
are of interest for the information exchange with other devices.” Figure 7-1 illustrates this 
concept, showing that the real devices on the right-hand side are modeled virtually as LNs 
[71]. Furthermore, the standard defines communication protocols to map the abstract 
models of data and services for data transfer between interfaces. Several protocols satisfy 
the application requirements in terms of performance and technicality. Finally, the standard 
specifies a configuration tool to put each individual part of the system together. This 
configuration is implemented using XML-based Substation Configuration Language 
(SCL), which provides the topology of the entire system in the context of IEC 61850 [78]. 
The standard’s advantage is that it provides a uniform communication mechanism within 
the substation that every IED vendor is obligated to follow. Therefore, utilities enjoy 
interoperable IEDs regardless of their manufacturer, which saves a significant amount of 
time, cost, and effort in dealing with the system. Moreover, the standard provides the 
flexibility to accommodate new applications as they evolve or are introduced to the market.  
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Figure 7-1 IEC 61850 virtual modeling approach [71]. 
7.2.1 Abstract Data and Service Modeling in IEC 61850 Context 
 The modeling process starts by introducing a virtual representation of a physical 
device through a logical device [7]. The physical device, which may contain several logical 
devices, is an actual device connected to the network and typically defined by its network 
address. Furthermore, each logical device contains one or more LNs that represent a set of 
data and services associated with a power system function [73], [75], [79]. The LNs are 
grouped according to the nature of the data and function of each LN. Therefore, the names 
of LNs begin with a character that represents their group; for example, the LNs for 
automatic control start with the letter “A” [75]. Additionally, each LN contains several data 
elements, each of which is assigned a unique name specified in the standard. An example 
of an LN and its data elements is an XCBR LN, which is used to model a circuit breaker. 
Its data elements include Loc to indicate remote or local operation, OpCnt to indicate 
operations count, Pos to indicate position status, a BlkOpn block to indicate open 
commands, a BlkCls block to indicate close commands, and CBOpCap for the circuit 
breaker operating capability [75]. These data elements belong to common data classes 
 123
(CDCs) specified in IEC 61850-7-3. The CDC describes the nature and structure of the 
data within the LN [73], [80]. The specified CDCs are, for example, controllable status 
information, controllable analog set point information, status settings, and analog settings. 
Each CDC has a defined name and a set of data attributes; the data attributes are simply 
the data elements, such as the status of the breaker. Figure 7-2 shows the overall data 
modeling approach.   
 
Figure 7-2 IEC 61850 data modeling [73]. 
 Data is communicated between different LNs within the substation by abstract 
services defined in IEC 61850, part 7.3. Figure 7-3 shows a top view of communication 




Figure 7-3 IEC 61850 abstract services acting on data models [74]. 
7.2.2 Communication Protocols 
 The abstract data models and services defined in IEC 61850 can be mapped to 
several communication protocols defined in IEC 61850-8-1 and depicted in Figure 7-4 
[81]. Furthermore, Figure 7-5 shows the performance requirement for each application. In 
general, the standard defines two types of communication mechanisms. The first type is a 
client/server-based mechanism typically used for HMI and SCADA applications [82]. The 
second type is peer-to-peer communication, which is typically used for fast data transfer 
between IEDs and MUs [7]. This type is based on a publisher–subscriber mechanism that 
uses a multicast transmission approach. An example implementation used the following 
three communication protocols to transmit data through the aforementioned mechanisms: 
1. The MMS protocol is used for client/server communication, which runs over 
TCP/IP or OSI networks [7], [73]. Thus, it functions with IP addresses through 
routers. Typically, an MMS client, such as SCADA, sends a request for an explicit 
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data element to the MMS server, which is usually an IED, specified through its IP 
address. The server responds to the request by returning the specified data to the 
client defined by its IP address. This protocol relies on the TCP protocol to verify 
data delivery.  
2. GOOSE messages capitalize on the multicast functionality, provided by Ethernet 
switches, that allows simultaneous communication with several IEDs [72], [83]. 
Thus, they operate on the publisher/subscriber principle. GOOSE communication 
transmits a fast event-driven signal such as a trip signal, which is not cyclic in nature 
[7]. Typically, an IED or MU sends a GOOSE message with the variables of the 
events that need to be communicated. Because of the messages’ multicast nature, 
the destination does not acknowledge delivery [72]. Therefore, to guarantee 
delivery, the same GOOSE message is resent several times. Moreover, to verify the 
virtual connectivity between source and destination, a cyclic GOOSE message is 
sent at a low rate of T0 specified by the user [7]. In most cases, GOOSE messages 
are applied directly to Ethernet switches (i.e., LAN) [7]. Subsequently, they are 
identified by their source MAC addresses. Moreover, GOOSE messages are not 
routable and cannot cross the routers.  
3. The sampled values protocol, as specified in IEC 61850-9-2, is used to 
communicate analog values (current and voltage) from unconventional sensors or 
MUs to the IEDs [84], [85]. Like GOOSE, this protocol capitalizes on the multicast 
functionality provided by Ethernet switches. Moreover, the messages are identified 
by their MAC addresses and are communicated periodically at high frequencies 
after being digitalized [1]. The standard (i.e., 61859-9-2LE) specifies a sampling 
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period of 250 and 208.3 s  for 50 and 60 Hz systems, respectively, for protection 
and most applications as well as a higher rate for metering and power quality.  
 
Figure 7-4 IEC 61850 communication protocols [81]. 
 
Figure 7-5 IEC 61850 performance requirement [7]. 
 The standard also specifies a configuration tool, XML-based Substation 
Configuration Language (SCL) [78]. There are four different configuration files:  
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1. A system-specification description (SSD) file that includes project information and 
the substation one-line diagram. 
2. An IED capability description (ICD) file that defines the LNs and services within 
an IED. 
3. A substation configuration description (SCD) file that details the connectivity and 
data transfer between the IEDs within the substation.  
4. A configured IED description (CID) file that is used to configure the IED with its 
intended function. 
7.2.3 IEC 61850 Substation Architecture 
 Figure 7-6 shows a typical IEC 61850 substation architecture consisting of two 
main layers [7], [73]. The first layer is the “process bus,” where data from MUs are 
collected and transmitted to the IEDs. The MUs collect the analog and digital data from 
the switchyard, convert the analog data to digital signals, and transmit all the data in digital 
format to the process bus [84]. Physically, the process bus consists of redundant fiber-optic 
cables connected to a redundant Ethernet switch [7]. To eliminate network congestion in 
the process bus, both virtual LAN (VLAN) and priority tagging are used [72]. The 
communication protocols used in the process bus are SV for analog signals and GOOSE 
for status and control signals. Therefore, the multicast communication mechanism is used. 
Furthermore, a timing signal (IEEE 1588) is available at the process bus connected to the 
MUs, and data are time-tagged accordingly. 
 The second layer in the architecture is the station bus through which data transfer 
takes place among and between IEDs, SCADA, and HMI. The communication protocols 
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used in the station bus are GOOSE for communication between IEDs and MMS for 
communication with SCADA and HMI [7], [72], [82]. Furthermore, a timing signal is 
available at the station bus, and data are time-tagged accordingly [2]. 
 
Figure 7-6 IEC 61850 substation architecture [7]. 
 Finally, this architecture supports remote network access through the station bus. 
Accordingly, an authorized client can access a wide range of information. Such clients 
could be local HMI, a control center, maintenance technician, or protection engineer [82]. 
7.2.4 Time Synchronization  
 Time synchronization is crucial for data communication between different devices 
within the substation. To reflect the power system operating states, these data are 
synchronized to a common time reference [86], [87]. The standard time reference currently 
used for most applications, including power systems, is coordinated universal time (UTC), 
which can be obtained through GPS satellite clock receivers [88]. Time synchronization is 
achievable through a dedicated timing system using a separate cabling system, as Figure 
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7-7 shows, or through the network used for substation automation, as Figure 7-8 shows 
[86], [87]. The former often uses one pulse per second (1-PPS) and the IRIG-B time code 
as time synchronization techniques, which both satisfy  1 μs accuracy [87]. The 
substation automation network can use the network time protocol (NTP) and the newly 
established IEEE 1588v2 protocol for applications that require time synchronization 
accuracy of  1 ms and  1 μs, respectively [87]. IEEE 1588v2 is expected to dominate in 
the near future because it has the advantage of using the local area network and providing 
high synchronization accuracy [86]–[88].  
  
Figure 7-7 Separate timing and communication networks in a substation [87]. 
  
Figure 7-8 Network topology for NTP and IEEE 1588v2 time synchronization [87]. 
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7.3 DSEBCPS System Architecture for Grassroots Installations  
 This section introduces our proposed architecture for the DSEBCPS considering 
grassroots installations, which means that the limitations of existing installations do not 
constrain the architecture. Figure 7-9 depicts the proposed architecture, showing that 
continuous data streaming in the process bus and station bus is key to the scheme’s reliable 
operation. The figure shows that data flow starts from the MU and telemetry data interface 
and proceeds to the settingless relays through the process bus, which consists of data 
concentrators and a set of Ethernet switches. This data are sampled values streamed at a 
rate of 4,800 samples/s for 60 Hz systems or 4,000 samples/s for 50 Hz systems. Such 
streaming at this rate from every measurement tool in the substation results in a huge set 
of data that requires special management. Therefore, the following subsections detail data 
management at the process bus. Furthermore, at the station bus, phasor quantities, which 
are computed in the settingless relays and transmitted from the remote substation through 
the telemetry data interface, are streamed to DSEBCPS at a rate of 1 sample/cycle through 
the station bus. Such data streaming of the phasor quantities from every IED is unique at 
the station bus. The following subsections also detail this process. Our architectural design 
proposes separating the process bus and the station bus into two separate networks because 
of the massive data traffic in the process bus. Additionally, a critical element for this 
architecture’s successful operation is time synchronization for the data, without which the 
settingless relay and DSEBCPS cannot operate reliably. Therefore, the entire architecture 
is based on GPS-synchronized measurements using the IEEE 1588v2 protocol, which 
sends a timing signal for both the process bus connected to the MUs and the station bus 
connected to the IEDs. All data are time-tagged accordingly. 
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Figure 7-9 Overall system architecture.  
7.3.1 Process Bus 
 The process bus carries data traffic in the form of sampled values originating from 
MUs or unconventional instrumentation channels. Figure 7-10 shows our proposed design 
for the process bus. The design consists of three main elements: (1) network topology, (2) 
data concentrator, and (3) time synchronization. 
7.3.1.1  Network Topology  
The process bus facilitates data flow from MUs to IEDs. Therefore, the process bus 
topology must ensure a reliable data flow to avoid unnecessary data interruption. The 
criteria for network topology selection are data recovery requirements and network 
bandwidth requirements [89], [90]. The data recovery requirements for the process bus 
have already been specified by IEC technical committee 57 (TC57) working group 10 
(WG10) to be zero time [91]. Zero time means that the recovery process must take place 
within the time of one sampling period. This requirement indicates that the process bus 
cannot afford data flow interruption. The bandwidth consumption during normal operation 
 132
for each MU is estimated to be up to 5 Mbps for the protection applications [89]. Therefore, 
the network backbone of the process bus must be designed to accommodate the total 
bandwidth consumption associated with data streaming from all MUs in the substation. For 
example, if the substation contains 100 MUs, the total bandwidth consumption is 500 
Mbps. Accordingly, the selection of the Ethernet switches must be sized accordingly to the 
total bandwidth. 
Considering the two criteria highlighted above, IEC 61850-9-2 explicitly specifies 
two topologies that satisfy the data recovery requirements [85], [91], [92]. The first 
topology is the high-availability seamless ring (HASR), which simply connects each 
element in the network in a ring topology. This configuration is not practical for process 
buses in big substations with massive numbers of MUs because of the limitation in the 
bandwidth capacity. Consequently, HASR cannot accommodate data traffic for large 
substations. The second topology specified in IEC 61850-9-2 is the parallel redundancy 
protocol (PRP), which simply duplicates the infrastructure for the network backbone. This 
entails creating two separate local area networks (i.e., LAN_A and LAN_B). These two 
networks are used simultaneously to carry data traffic streaming from each MU. 
Accordingly, the destinations (i.e., the IEDs) receive duplicate data from both networks 
when they are healthy. Therefore, a duplicate detection mechanism must be implemented 
to phase out one set of the duplicate information [91]. The PRP consists of the network 
backbone, which is a set of Ethernet switches connected to each other, and network 
branches (i.e., MUs and IEDs). The size of the network backbone from a data perspective 
depends on the size of the Ethernet switches, which are available up to 1 Tbps. Thus, the 
PRP can fit perfectly into a larger substation because it can accommodate massive data 
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traffic without any limitations. Moreover, the redundancy in the PRP topology ensures 
reliable and uninterrupted data flow, which is extremely important for power system 
protection applications. 
Our design for the process bus, depicted in Figure 7-10, adapts the PRP topology. 
We have introduced a data concentrator into the design as part of the network backbone. 
The function of the data concentrator is to receive data streaming from MUs, align them, 
generate time stamps, and stream them again to IEDs (i.e., settingless relays). In this 
topology, duplicated set of data are streamed from each MU and telemetry data interface 
to the data concentrators in LAN_A and LAN_B through Ethernet switches. The data 
concentrators process the data and stream them to the settingless relays through another set 
of Ethernet switches as data packets for each relay. The design is fully redundant as per the 
PRP topology structure, where each element in the backbone network is duplicated, 
including the data concentrator. The design does not include any single point of failure. 
Accordingly, each settingless relay is equipped with a duplicate data detection mechanism 
to handle redundant data streams. Moreover, the selection of the Ethernet switches must be 
engineered properly according to the expected data traffic in the substation, which depends 
primarily on the number of MUs and telemetry data interfaces. It is important to note that 
each settingless relay consists of several LNs to facilitate the required functions; for 
example, each relay will include an LN that represents DSE functions. Similarly, MUs 
consist of several LNs, such as TCTR for current measurements and TVTR for voltage 
measurements. Accordingly, the data transfer will take place between these LNs.  
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Figure 7-10 Process bus topology for grassroots installation.  
7.3.1.2 Data Concentrator 
Accurate data streaming is extremely important for reliable operation of both 
settingless relays and DSEBCPS. Consequently, in our design of the system architecture, 
we have introduced a data concentrator, which is a device that collects data streaming from 
MUs and telemetry interfaces, aligns, and streams them again as data packets to individual 
IEDs. Accordingly, each IED receives its corresponding data packet, which is ready for 
final processing. Each data concentrator includes two interfaces: an MU data interface and 
an elementary data interface. These are separated because the telemetry data’s remotely 
communicated destination is transmitted through different communication channels. This 
could impose additional challenges in handling such data. Moreover, as Figure 7-10 shows, 
we propose including two concentrators in the substation to satisfy the PRP topology’s 
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redundancy requirement. Each data concentrator is capable of performing the required 
functions independently.  
The data concentrator’s main task is to aggregate data from different sources. This 
task could be undermined by data latency if it is not handled properly [93]–[95]. Data 
latency is the time difference between data creation at a source and data processing at a 
destination. The main sources of the data latency is the time required to transmit the data 
through switches as well as transmit the data over fiber-optic cable. This time depends on 
the switch design as well as the distance the data must travel between the source and the 
destination. Figure 7-11 depicts the different components that could affect the latency time 
and shows that each node within the communication path increases the latency time [93]. 
Moreover, this time is magnified for the telemetry data because they are traveling across 
long distances and pass through several communication channels. Furthermore, the 
Ethernet port in the data concentrator must be properly sized to handle the massive data 
streaming from the substation and avoid further latency time. 
There is a very important distinction here: SVs are time tagged as they come out of 
the MU in the Data concentrators. Telemetry SV are time tagged at the source. If these two 
things happen, latency can be tolerated and it will not cause problems. The data 
concentrator task is to time align the data. This distinction justifies the separation in 
handling the SV and telemetry data    
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Figure 7-11 Latency time illustration.   
The issue of latency is network related and cannot be avoided. However, we must 
deal with it to ensure reliable operation of the settingless relays. Thus, we propose 
aggregating the data into a circular buffer with a maximum waiting time for each sample 
that should be more than the maximum latency time. The circular buffer is designed to 
handle a specific amount of data at each time tag. The process is depicted in Figure 7-12, 
which shows that when the last piece of data within a specific time tag has arrived, or when 
the maximum waiting time has elapsed, the data are aligned, tagged in a timely manner, 
and placed in the output channel. The data in the output channel are grouped into data 
packets based on the final destination. This process also justifies the separation of the 
telemetry data interface into a separate circular buffer because of the expected longer 
latency time and different time tagging mechanism. When the data concentrator does not 
receive all the expected measurements, they will be considered missing data. Moreover, if 
the data are received after the waiting time, they will be discarded. The data in the output 
channel includes data aggregated from both circular buffers. This process of data 
aggregation introduces the data concentrator’s latency, which needs to be considered in the 
overall performance of the system. 
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Figure 7-12 Data aggregation in the circular buffer.   
The circular buffers in the data concentrators have a limited storage capacity for the 
aggregated data from MUs and telemetry data interfaces. This storage capacity specifies 
the buffer size, which is dependent on maximum expected latency. Accordingly, the buffer 
size is critical and must be calculated properly to avoid important data losses. The chosen 
size must allow a significant margin for the processing time of the data concentrator in 
addition to the waiting time. Data concentrator design must also take input capacity into 
consideration. This capacity is defined as the capability to successfully process 
measurements without increasing the concentrator latency [93]. Input capacity is very 
important because of the enormous number of input measurements at the substation level. 
Therefore, the input capacity must be sized properly based on the size of the data streaming 




7.3.1.3 Time Synchronization  
Time synchronization is critical for reliable operation of both settingless relays and 
centralized protection schemes. The required timing accuracy for such applications is less 
than 1 μs. Accordingly, we propose using the IEEE 1588v2 time synchronization standard 
known as the precision time protocol. This protocol operates through a data network and 
can achieve time accuracy of less than 1 μs. This section offers more details about the 
overall concept of the protocol and its implementation requirements. 
IEEE 1588v2 is a time synchronization protocol that uses a data network and 
accomplish timing accuracy of less than 1 μs [87], [88], [96]. The synchronization network 
consists of a master clock and a set of slave clocks. Each slave clock is synchronized to the 
master clock so that both clocks provide exactly the same time. This master–slave IEEE 
1588v2 synchronization network consists of the following three types of clock based on 
the location of the clock in the network [87], [96]: 
1. An ordinary clock, which is a clock located in an end device, such as an IED. It 
can act as both master and slave clock. 
2. A boundary clock, which is a clock located in the interface between two 
subnetworks. It will act as a slave clock for the upstream network and master 
clock for the downstream network.   
3. A transparent clock is an intermediate layer (i.e., Network Bridge or switch) 
between the master and slave clocks. It has the ability to measure the residence 
time of an IEEE 1588v2 message within the clock and the delay of the link to 
the destination (i.e., the slave clock). 
 139
The first step in the 1588v2 synchronization process is to identify the type of each clock 
in the network and then establish the master–slave hierarchy. The best master clock 
algorithm is used to identify the most suitable clock in the network as the master clock 
[27]. Furthermore, the algorithm defines the state of each clock as either master or 
slave. Subsequently, the master clock port will stream IEEE 1588 messages to the 
network. This process is clarified in Figure 7-13, which shows the time difference 
between the master and slave clocks, denoted by 1
t
 
[96]. This time is measured by 
sending IEEE 1588 messages (i.e., data packet A) from the master clock through the 
Ethernet network to the slave clocks. The master clock records the time when data 
packet was sent, denoted by t1. The data packet propagates in the network and reaches 
the slave clock after a propagation delay denoted by 2
t . When the slave clock receives 
the data packet, it generates timestamp t2. Thus, the relationship between t1 and t2 is 
expressed as the following: 
2 1 2 1
t t t t     
Similarly, the slave clock sends back IEEE 1588 messages (i.e., data packet B) with 
timestamp t3 at the slave clock. This data packet reaches the master clock after a 
propagation delay of 2
t . When the master clock receives this data packet, it generates 
a timestamp of t4. Therefore, the relationship between t3 and t4 is expressed as the 
following: 
 
4 3 1 2
t t t t       
(7.1) 
 ( 7.2) 
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The timestamps at the master clock (i.e., t1 and t4) are sent to the slave clock and are 
used along with the slave clock’s timestamps (i.e., t2 and t3) to calculate 1
t  as follows: 
 1 2 3 4
1 2
t t t t
t
  
     
The slave clock uses 1
t to correct its internal time to synchronize with the master clock. 
This process becomes more involved with the introduction of transparent clocks, which 
introduce additional propagation delay that must be considered.    
 
Figure 7-13 Illustration of the master–slave clock operation principle.  
 The time synchronization process is used to timely align the sampled values in the 
MUs and create time stamp for each sample in the process bus. The MUs align the data by 
establishing a 1-second sampling window that starts at the beginning of each second. 
During this period the MU uses a counter that counts the number of samples per second. It 
        (7.3) 
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is initialized with 0 and incremented by one. At the end of the second, it sets back to 0. 
This process is repeated every second to continually align the sampled values streamed to 
the process bus. The data concentrator in the process bus receives the data streams from 
the MU and establishes the time stamp for each sample using the sampling rate and the 
sample value count.  
7.3.2 Station Bus  
 The station bus facilitates data exchange between settingless relays and DSEBCPS. 
This includes phasor quantities streaming from settingless relays to DSEBCPS at a 
sampling rate specified by the end user. Moreover, upon detecting hidden failure the 
DSEBCPS streams the calculated sampled values corresponding to the compromised data 
to the settingless relay, which suffers from hidden failures, at a rate and in sync with the 
MUs to override the compromised measurements. Furthermore, GOOSE message 
exchanges between the IED and DSEBCPS takes place in the station bus. These GOOSE 
messages include but are not limited to breaker status, disconnect status, settingless relays 
operation status, and DSEBCPS permissive signal to settingless relays.  
Continuous phasor quantities streaming is critical for reliable operation of 
DSEBCPS. Thus, station bus topology must insure a reliable data flow to avoid 
unnecessary data interruption. As in the case of the process bus, the criteria for network 
topology are data recovery requirements and network bandwidth requirements[88]-[90]. 
The data recovery requirement for the station bus for our application is zero time. We 
impose this requirement to enable the DSEBCPS to have continuous supervision of the 
settingless relays through continuous DSE performance in the quasi-domain. This 
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requirement indicates that the station bus cannot afford data flow interruption. The size of 
the network bandwidth depends on the rate of the data flow, which is smaller than that of 
the process bus. According to the mentioned criteria, we propose to use the Parallel 
Redundancy Protocol (PRP), which simply duplicates the network backbone infrastructure. 
This entails creating two separate local area networks (i.e., LAN_A and LAN_B), as Figure 
7-14 shows. These two networks are used simultaneously to carry data from each IED to 
DSEBCPS, which receives duplicated data from both networks when they are healthy. 
Therefore, a duplicate detection mechanism must be implemented to phase out one of the 
duplicated data [91]. Similar to the process bus, the PRP consists of a network backbone, 
which is a set of Ethernet switches connected with each other, and network branches (i.e., 
IEDs and DSEBCPS). The size of the network backbone from the data perspective depends 
on the size of the Ethernet switches, which depends on the amount of data exchanged.  
Figure 7-14 shows phasor quantities streaming from settingless relays and 
telemetry interfaces to DSEBCPS. In this design, we have incorporated the data 
concentrator within the DSEBCPS. Therefore, the data concentrator in the station bus is 
considered a function in the DSEBCPS. The concept of the data concentrator is identical 
to that of the process bus. It is important to note that the DSE function within the DSEBCPS 
is considered for this design as a logical node. The degree of redundancy can be extended 
to the DSEBCPS hardware by considering two separate DSEBCPS devices (i.e., 
computers). This option is left to the end user to decide. Finally, time synchronization at 
the station bus is achieved by using PTP as per IEEE1588v2. 
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Figure 7-14 Station bus topology.   
7.4 DSEBCPS System Architecture for Existing Installations  
This section discusses the deployment of the DSEBCPS in existing substations, 
including legacy protection relays. Moreover, the substation could include settingless 
relays as primary protection for some zones or in parallel with the legacy protection relays. 
Therefore, this setup forms a conventional substation, which includes digital technology 
deployed in part of the substation. Conventional substations with legacy protection have 
always used copper cable wiring to transfer signals between the primary equipment, such 
as circuit breakers, instrumentation channels, and legacy protection relays. For digital 
technologies, data transfer takes place through communication networks as per IEC 61850 
requirements. This setup of a conventional substation supplemented with digital 
technology is expected to dominate in the short term. Therefore, defining the architecture 
of such a substation will pave the way for smooth migration toward deploying both 
settingless relays and DSEBCPS and adapting the digital substation technology.  
The proposed architecture is depicted in Figure 7-15, which shows that the 
instrumentation channels at the switchyard are connected through hardwires to the legacy 
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protection relays. Additionally, the settingless relays receive sampled values streaming 
from MUs and telemetry data interfaces at a rate of 4800 sample/s through the process bus, 
which will be created to facilitate such data transfer. Moreover, phasor quantities are 
streaming from the settingless relays and telemetry interfaces to the DSEBCPS at the rate 
of one sample/cycle. The legacy protection relays could participate in the phasor quantity 
streaming if they have such streaming capabilities. Moreover, GOOSE messages are 
transferred between the MU and settingless relays through the process bus and between the 
legacy protection relays and DSEBCPS through the station bus. Finally, the entire 
architecture is based on GPS-synchronized measurements using the IEEE 1588v2 protocol. 
 
Figure 7-15 Overall system architecture of existing substation. 
      The process bus in this application for existing substations facilitates 
communication between the settingless relays and MUs. It is identical to the process bus 
explained in the previous section for the grass-root implementation. For the station bus we 
suggest introducing a dedicated new portion for data streaming to the DSEBCPS, as Figure 
7-16 shows. This new portion is connected with the existing station bus to communicate 
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the phasor quantities from the legacy protection relays, which have such capabilities, to the 
DSEBCPS. This design could require reinforcement to the existing part to accommodate 
the new data streaming. Several design options are available for the station bus in an 
existing substation, depending on the end users’ requirements. 
 
Figure 7-16 Proposed station bus topology for existing substation. 
7.5 Future Energy Management Systems 
The advancement in power systems and the introduction of new resources, which involve 
new operational challenges, necessitate more capable control centers for reliable operation. 
Decision making in the future grid requires innovative approaches to overcome existing 
limitations. These approaches include advanced data management, sophisticated analytics 
capabilities, and massive computational capabilities. Our proposed DSEBCPS and its 
architecture provide the required infrastructure at the substation level for future energy 
management systems. The DSEBCPS makes enormous measurement data available on a 
central platform that can be streamed to the control center. Moreover, the availability of 
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the accurate substation model within the DSEBCPS, which can be sent to the control 
centers, provides opportunities for real-time applications such as contingency analysis 
before executing switching scenarios. These capabilities make the control centers more 
effective in decision making and ensure a reliable and cost-effective operation for power 
system networks. 
       The future EMSs use a distributed state estimation, the DSEBCPS, as a source of 
data acquisition and substation models to support all required applications. Specifically, 
each substation sends its real-time model through the DSEBCPS to the EMS whenever the 
substation topology is changed or a new device is introduced, which are not frequent 
events. Therefore, the process of synthesizing the substation model does not require 
continuous processing, which drastically decreases throughput requirements for the 
communication network. Additionally, the estimated substation states phasor quantities 
computed by the DSEBCPS are available to be sent to EMS once every cycle and can be 
streamed to the EMS at this rate or at a different rate based on communication infrastructure 
capabilities and the application’s requirements. Along with the estimated phasor quantities, 
the DSEBCPS can send several sets of substation alarms that can be used to develop 
awareness about substation conditions and activate any security measurements to ensure 
reliable operation.   
       Furthermore, the EMS uses the states of each substation to compute the system 
states in real time. These states can be used in many applications associated with 
economical and secure power system operation, as Figure 7-17 shows. In computing the 
system states, the EMS combines substation models to represent the entire system model. 
Then the phasor quantities of substations’ states are used to compute the system states. The 
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availability of the system models and the system data, which are synchronized through a 
GPS clock, makes this process straightforward. Furthermore, this process is computed in 
the quasi-dynamic domain, which means the data obtained from the DSEBCPS can be used 
without further processing. Finally, the DSEBCPS paves the way for advanced EMS 
capable of performing several applications for a resilient power system and overcoming 
the challenges of operating the future grid. 
  
Figure 7-17 Future energy management system. 
7.6 Cybersecurity  
We envision the proposed DEBCPS and its architecture as an important step toward 
a seamless transition to digital substations. The digital substation represents a new cyber 
infrastructure paradigm for the power grid. As for any cyber infrastructure, cybersecurity 
arises as a critical risk that could undermine this architecture’s advantages. The enormous 
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number of electronic devices (i.e., DSEBCPS and settingless relays) interconnected via 
communication networks at the system level multiplies such risk. These devices represent 
the heart of power system operation, which cannot afford malfunctions resulting from 
cyber-attacks on the system. Accordingly, this issue jeopardizes power system operation 
reliability and security; such an attack would subject the system to a catastrophic scenario 
such as a total blackout or infrastructure damage. The most critical attacks for a digital 
substation include (a) malicious modification of control data, such as the settings of the 
protection system, operation parameters and others and (b) insertion of malicious 
commands that would cause the power system to misoperate [97]–[99]. Therefore, 
researchers have given cybersecurity much attention. In general, any cybersecurity solution 
has two main requirements: attack detection and efficient communication protocol 
maintenance [98], [99]. The former includes continually monitoring network traffic to 
identify abnormal conditions resulting from attacks. This can be achieved through an 
authentication process for every command to verify its legitimacy. The second important 
requirement entails that any proposed solution does not affect the efficiency of the 
communication protocol. This requirement is critical because most digital substation 
applications are time sensitive, which requires an efficient communication protocol. 
Accordingly, researchers have proposed several solutions such as access control, trusted 
computing, and authentication and intrusion detection [99], [100]. Research into more 
effective solution is ongoing.  
7.7 Summary  
This chapter discussed our design to the architecture of the proposed DCEBCPS. 
This architecture is based on IEC 61850, which permits interoperability between products 
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from different vendors. The proposed architecture for grassroots installation entails 
separating the station bus and process bus into two separate networks, each of which was 
designed using the parallel redundancy protocol (PRP) topology, which duplicates the 
infrastructure for the network backbone and provides full redundancy. Moreover, the entire 
architecture is based on GPS-synchronized measurements using the IEEE 1588v2 protocol, 
which sends a timing signal for both the process bus connected to the MUs and the station 
bus connected to the IEDs. All data are time-tagged accordingly. Additionally, the 
architecture of the DSEBCPS in existing substations, which includes legacy protection 
relays, paves the way for smooth migration to the proposed system. The proposed 
architecture provides the necessary infrastructure for the next generation of energy 
management systems by providing the necessary data and real-time models to the control 
center to perform the usual control center functions, such as state estimation, optimization, 
and control. Finally, cybersecurity arises as critical risk that could undermine the proposed 
system’s advantages. This risk requires more attention from researchers and experts to 
develop a reliable solution. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND 
FUTURE WORK 
8.1 Conclusion  
The power system is experiencing revolutionary changes driven by the introduction 
of customer-owned and renewable energy resources. These resources introduce significant 
changes in power system characteristics. These changes impose new challenges for every 
aspect of the power system, one of which is protection. These challenges are concurrent 
with utilities’ efforts to boost system reliability. Such efforts are undermined by protection 
system vulnerability to hidden failures, which are defects that become apparent during a 
switching event in the power system network and cause the protection system to 
misoperate. They might widen the power system interruption by isolating a healthy portion 
of the power system. Each component in the protection system is vulnerable to such 
failures. Furthermore, technology advancements pave the way for introducing a new 
protection system to overcome the aforementioned challenges. Employing these 
technologies in developing new approaches results in protection systems able to cope with 
the new changes in the power system, detect hidden failures, and avoid misoperations.  
Toward that goal, we developed a dynamic state estimation-based centralized 
protection scheme (DSEBCPS) to secure the protection system of a substation against 
hidden failures. The DSEBCPS supervises all the individual protection zone relays within 
a substation, detects and identifies hidden failures, and corrects the compromised data. We 
have employed the dynamic state estimation to detect any substation abnormality. Once an 
abnormality has been detected, hypothesis testing is employed to distinguish between 
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hidden failure(s) and power fault(s). The high level of redundancy in the measurements at 
the substation level eliminates the possibility of leverage points which enables highly 
efficient hypothesis testing. During hidden failure detection, the scheme activates a data 
correction module to replace compromised data with valid data. We have tested the 
DSEBCPS with numerous numerical experiments that demonstrated the capabilities of the 
proposed DSEBCPS. They showed that the scheme exploits the huge redundancy in 
measurements at the substation level that makes hypothesis testing quite efficient. Also, it 
can be concluded from the numerical examples that the scheme is capable of detecting 
other types of hidden failures in the instrumentation channels. The research proposed the 
integration of DSEBCPS with the newly emerged concept of settingless relays to ensure 
its secure and dependable operation even in the presence of hidden failures. The concept 
of DSEBCPS can be easily applied with legacy protection zone relays. Whether a 
substation is equipped with legacy-protective relays or settingless relays, the DSEBCPS 
closes a critical gap in protection systems, namely securing the operation of relays in the 
case of hidden failures while maintaining high dependability. The integration of the 
proposed scheme and the individual zone protection schemes forms a resilient protection 
system that is self-immunized against hidden failures.  
Moreover, we have proposed an IEC 61850-based architecture of the DSEBCPS with 
a high degree of redundancy at every layer. The architecture entails separating the process 
bus and the station bus into two separate local networks. We proposed a PRP topology for 
the process and station buses to satisfy the criterion of “zero time” data recovery. 
Furthermore, we introduced data concentrators at both the station and process buses. The 
data concentrators aggregate data from different sources and overcome the challenge of 
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data latency. Moreover, the entire architecture is based on GPS-synchronized 
measurements using the IEEE 1588v2 protocol. All data are accordingly time tagged. 
Furthermore, the proposed architecture provides the necessary infrastructure for the next 
generation of energy management systems. This mission is achieved by providing the 
necessary data and real-time models to the control center to perform the usual control center 
functions, such as state estimation, optimization, and control. Finally, cybersecurity arises 
as a critical risk that could undermine the advantage of the proposed system. This risk 
requires more attention from researchers and experts to develop a reliable solution. 
8.2 Contributions 
The present thesis has made the following contributions: 
 A new substation-centralized protection scheme based on dynamic state estimation 
(DSE). The new scheme is implemented in an object-oriented manner that makes 
it comprehensive and applicable for any substation. It monitors the whole 
substation through its measurements collected from the individual protection zones 
and uses these measurements to perform dynamic state estimation for the whole 
substation. The proposed scheme is capable of detecting abnormalities within the 
substation in a secure, dependable, and timely manner.  
 The proposed scheme is capable of detecting hidden failures in the individual 
protection zone via hypothesis testing. This capability bridges a critical gap in 
protection systems that causes numerous misoperations.  
 The integration of the proposed scheme and individual zone protection form a 
resilient protection system self-immunized against hidden failures. 
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 The proposed architecture is IEC-61850 compliant. It is aligned with worldwide 
efforts to design the architecture of the digital substation, and we hope that our work 
will make a significant contribution toward this goal.  
8.3 Future Research Directions  
The DSEBCPS performs DSE at the substation level using all the available 
measurements at the substation and the substation model, which consists of the model of 
different devices within the substation. This modeling approach can be enhanced by 
including the model of the instrumentation channels along with the main devices. The 
advantage of such a step is to increase the accuracy of the DSE by eliminating the error 
generated by considering an ideal instrumentation channel. This step will increase the 
computational burden of the DSEBCPS. Therefore, a thorough evaluation of the most 
optimal approach to include the models of instrumentation channels is needed.  
Furthermore, we have proposed in the DSEBCPS a data correction module that 
streams the calculated sampled values corresponding to the detected bad measurements to 
the sample value circular buffers to override the compromised measurements. The scheme 
ensures that all settingless relays use validated data. In its present implementation, this 
process may be affected by the harmonic components and transient conditions in the system 
which might affect the settingless relay response. Therefore, the settingless relay response 
can be enhanced by including the harmonic components of the waveforms in performing 
the DSE. Furthermore using the time-dynamic domain for the centralized protection 
scheme instead of the quasi-dynamic domain will eliminate the aforementioned limitations. 
Such enhancements will increase the accuracy of the DSE. However, they will also increase 
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the computational burden of the DSEBCPS and increase data traffic in the station bus. 
Accordingly, this process needs to be evaluated in terms of feasibility and the need for such 
enhancements.  
We envision the proposed DSEBCPS and its architecture as an important step toward 
a seamless transition to the digital substation. This involves a dramatic increase in the cyber 
infrastructure in the substations and eventually in the power system. This makes the system 
vulnerable to cyberattacks. The proposed dynamic state estimation-based method in this 
dissertation can be employed to detect cyberattacks. More specifically, the DSE algorithm 
and hypothesis testing can be used to (a) detect data attacks in real time and (b) develop a 
command authentication method to detect maliciously inserted commands. Such a 
technique needs to be developed further and assisted with faster-than-real-time simulation 
for command authentication, which involves three steps: (1) command capturing (i.e., 
intrusion), (2) impact evaluation of the captured commands through performing the DSE 
and hypothesis testing, and (3) command authentication or command blocking.  
DSEBCPS and its architecture can be used as the base for a future energy 
management system where the proposed system will provide the necessary data and real-
time models to the control center for performing the usual control center functions, such as 
state estimation, optimization, and control. The EMS uses the substation model and states 
obtained from the DSEBCPS of each substation to compute the system states in real time. 
These states can be used in many applications associated with a power system’s economic 
and secure operation. A detailed framework for such EMS needs to be developed and 
detailed. 
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APPENDIX A.  CURRENT TRANSFORMER 
A.1   Introduction  
This Appendix presents the time domain single-phase current transformer model. The 
equivalent circuit of a current transformer is illustrated in Figure A-1.  
 
Figure A-1 CT Equivalent Circuit 
The user interface and parameter settings of CT model is shown in Figure A-2. 
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Figure A-2 User interface and parameters of a Current Transformer  
A.2  Time Domain Model  
A.2.1 Compact Form 











For linear case  
0
1
  (A.6a) 




  (A.6b) 
There are six equations and six state variables: 
, , 0, 0, 0, 0  
, , , ,  ,  
A.2.2 Quadratized Model  
 The model is quadratized by introducing additional internal state variables, so that 
the nth exponent is replaced by equations of at most quadratic degree. Since the exact degree 
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of nonlinearity is not known until the user specifies it, the model performs automatic 
quadratization of the equations. A special procedure is used, so that the model is 
quadratized using the minimum number of additional internal states, while also 
maintaining the scarcity of the resulting equations. The methodology is based on 
expressing the exponent in binary form. The binary representation provides all the 
information about the number of new variables and equations that need to be introduced 
and about the form of the equations (products of new variables). The procedure is described 













For linear case:  
0
1
  (A.13a) 
For nonlinear case: 
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0  (A.13b+2) 
0 ∙  (A.13b+m1+1) 
0 ∙  (A.13b+m1+2) 
⋯⋯  
⋯⋯  







There are 7 + m equations and 7 + m state variables: 
, , 0, 0, 0, 0… , 0  
, , , , ,  , , …  
Based on the above formulation, the number of additional internal states and equations m 
is computed as follows: 
21 mmm   
where 
))(int(log21 nm   
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2m (# of ones in the binary representation of n) – 1 
Given the exponent = 5, the mathematical expression of the time domain quadratized 
device model is: 
1 1 1 1
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Other matrices are zero 
A.2.3 SCAQCF Model   
The differential equations in above model are integrated with the quadratic integration 
method and the equations that are algebraic are sufficed to be written at times t and tm. The 
SCAQCF model yields the following model. 
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APPENDIX B.  POTENTIAL TRANSFORMER 
B.1 Introduction  
This appendix presents the time domain model for single-phase potential transformer. The 
equivalent circuit of a potential transformer is illustrated in Figure B-1. 
4 ( )v t
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1( )v t
2 ( )v t














Figure B-1 PT Equivalent Circuit  
where h is the integration time step, and resistance gs stabilizes the numerical integration. 
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Figure B-2 User interface and parameters of a potential Transformer  
B.2.  Time Domain Model 
B.2.1. Compact Form 














0  (B.9) 
0  (B.10) 




  (B.11a) 




  (B.11b) 
There are 10 equations and 10 state variables: 
, , , , 0, 0, 0, 0,0,0  
, , , , , , , , ,  
B.2.1  Quadratized Form 
The model is quadratized by introducing additional internal state variables, so that the nth 
exponent is replaced by equations of at most quadratic degree. Since the exact degree of 
nonlinearity is not known until the user specifies it, the model performs automatic 
quadratization of the equations. A special procedure is used, so that the model is 
quadratized using the minimum number of additional internal states, while also 
maintaining the scarcity of the resulting equations. The methodology is based on 
expressing the exponent in binary form. The binary representation provides all the 
information about the number of new variables and equations that need to be introduced 
and about the form of the equations (products of new variables). The procedure is described 







0  (B.16) 
0  (B.17) 
0  (B.18) 
0  (B.19) 
0  (B.20) 









0  (B.25) 
0  (B.26) 
For linear case:  
0
1
  (B.27a) 
For nonlinear case: 
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0 ∙  (B.29b+m1+2) 
⋯⋯  
⋯⋯  






There are 16 + m equations and 16 + m state variables: 
, , , , 0, 0, … ,0,0  
 
, , , , , , , ,
	 , , , , , , , , , … ,
 
where m is computed as explained in Appendix A 
 
B.2.3 SCAQCF Model  
The differential equations in above model are integrated with the quadratic integration 
method and the equations that are algebraic are sufficed to be written at times t and tm. The 
SCAQCF model yields the following model. 
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